On 6 December, Romania’s constitutional court cancelled the first round of the presidential election, held on 24 November. This small earthquake came after the incumbent liberal president, Klaus Iohannis, released documents from the Supreme Council of National Defence (CSAT) showing that the pro-Russian, anti-EU candidate Călin Georgescu had gained a leg-up on the social network TikTok with the help of some 25,000 accounts belonging to “a foreign state”.
It was a case of “aggressive hybrid action by Russia”, said CSAT. Moscow denies any involvement. Georgescu, who had been polling at less than 7% ten days before the election, came out on top in the first round with just under 23% of the vote, ahead of liberal candidate Elena Lasconi. All this while declaring that he had not spent a penny on his campaign… A new first round of the presidential election will now take place in March.
Georgescu’s rise is also “a symptom of the country’s deeper problems, the same ones that have fuelled the rise of the far right in general”, says Cornelia Mazilu in Adevărul. Interviewed by Mazilu, political scientist Veronica Anghel believes that Georgescu’s rise “was artificially produced by TikTok, but that the causes of his rise are real”. In her view, the sovereigntist candidate’s success is “a protest vote against the main parties that have been in power for a very long time and have done nothing”. Anghel also notes that “Romanians are not very supportive of Ukraine compared to other European countries. The Romanian government supports Ukraine, she says, but the population was not consulted on this decision. “The point is not that Romanians are stingy, but rather that they were attracted by the idea of neutrality and by the argument that the war is more the result of the actions of NATO and the United States.”
In the Journal of Democracy, Anghel writes that “two key realities” have emerged following the Constitutional Court’s decision:
“First, Romanian authorities have laid bare the breadth and sophistication of Russia’s influence operations, exposing how readily democratic institutions can be undermined by hostile foreign forces. Romania’s inability to preempt such a large-scale breach of its election integrity, coupled with its delayed response to foreign meddling on behalf of a Russian-backed candidate, elicited swift and alarmed reactions from NATO partners. Second, the confusion and distrust unleashed by this episode highlights a more unsettling truth: The European Union and NATO remain vulnerable to the fragility of their member states’ democratic foundations. This moment serves as a stark reminder that well-meaning actions – such as the court’s decision to halt a compromised election midstream – may nevertheless do grievous harm. In this instance, while the court kept the Romanian government from falling under Russian influence, such an opaque, drastic, and unexpected remedy can inadvertently steer a society toward profound turmoil.”
Georgescu has painted himself as the victim of a “coup d’état” by the “mafia courts”. Will he be able to muster the same performance in the new presidential election? In recent months, Georgescu had amassed almost 580,000 followers on TikTok, observes Daniel Guta in Adevărul. And yet “his popularity seems to be falling” since the constitutional court ruling, and “the number of views recorded by his latest videos is much lower than usual”, as is “the number of comments on his clips”.
Interesting article?
It was made possible by Voxeurop’s community. High-quality reporting and translation comes at a cost. To continue producing independent journalism, we need your support.
Subscribe or Donate
For Moldovan journalist and writer Paula Erizanu, writing in The Guardian, this fraudulent election has left the country “mired in its most serious political crisis for 35 years”. It is still unclear what happened, but:
“For anyone familiar with Russian disinformation tactics, the methods by which [Georgescu] rose to prominence felt all too familiar. Some of Georgescu’s most popular content on TikTok, the platform considered key in his sudden rise days before the election, fomented Romanians’ fears of having to fight on the frontlines in neighbouring Ukraine. […] The Romanian government has not communicated enough to reassure its population that they won’t be conscripted – and Russian disinformation is thriving in this vacuum.”
It’s a pattern that seems to be repeating itself across the region, observes Erizanu:
“Since war broke out, Russia has been exploiting the violence in Ukraine to instil fear in eastern European nations, masking its own imperialist ambition behind the smoke and mirrors that its invasion is a wider Nato-Russia conflict in which Kyiv is a mere pawn and Moscow is Washington’s victim.
Echoing this narrative, Georgescu promised peace and highlighted signs that he claimed showed the West wants to go to war – such as Germany’s moves to prepare civilians and troops in case of an attack. In addition to promising to end Romania’s military help to Ukraine, Georgescu falsely yet indignantly claimed that Ukrainian children in the country received more state support than Romanian kids. Narratives aiming to foster anti-Ukrainian sentiment have been pushed through social media in countries neighbouring Ukraine since Russia’s full-scale invasion.”
The Romanian presidential poll rounds off an eventful election year in Europe. The far-right has cemented its position everywhere as a rising force. “Europe’s far-right problem is not going away”, sighs Alessio Giussani, editor-in-chief of Green European Journal, whose latest edition is devoted to the phenomenon. “June’s elections delivered the most right-wing European Parliament in history. Hard-right parties are involved in government in over a quarter of EU member states […] Even once celebrated exceptions to the rise of far-right forces, Spain and Portugal, have now conformed to the rule.” Not forgetting the re-election of Trump across the Atlantic, “greeted with jubilation by his transatlantic allies”.
The appeal of right-wing populism is nothing new in Europe. “But it is mainly through influencing discourse that the far right has cemented its success”, believes Giussani:
“The digital revolution and the crisis of traditional media have ushered in an era of endless possibilities for right-wing ideologues, unscrupulous campaigners, and political entrepreneurs. Culture wars against real or imagined enemies […] serve to conceal the far right’s internal divisions and the gap between its rhetoric and its largely pro-elite track record. If economic insecurities are the causes of far-right support, cultural panic is its fuel.”
Nevertheless, the Green European Journal’s editor thinks it would be a mistake to overestimate the movement’s appeal: “perhaps the best way to confront the far -ight is not to centre its narratives in order to counter them, but to find the courage to look elsewhere: to focus less on what we oppose and more on the world we desire.”
