Shadow-boxing turns real for Israel and Iran

In apparent defiance of the Biden administration, the Netanyahu government has now initiated missile strikes against Iran.

Last Saturday night (Sunday morning in New Zealand) Iran launched more than 300 drones, cruise missiles and ballistic missiles against Israeli military targets. With the assistance of US, UK and possibly French forces, and – more unexpectedly – those of Jordan, Israel was able to intercept what it said was 99 percent of the inbound missiles.

Iran’s vast but virtually bloodless air assault was unprecedented, unusual and like many other things in the Middle East, hard to decipher. Like much of what happens in the region, it needs to be examined for its symbolic and theatrical content as much as its military impact.

The optics of large numbers of Iranian missiles reaching Israeli soil, albeit ineffectively, and with many teething problems, may have been sufficient for some observers to conclude that the ledger had been cleared.

On its simplest level, the attack was intended to assuage an Iranian need not to look weak in the face of Israeli provocation after the brazen attack on the Iranian consulate which killed seven officials including a top commander in Iran’s elite Revolutionary Guards (IRGC) and was clearly inconsistent with the 1961 Vienna Convention on diplomatic immunity.

Israel did not officially confirm it carried out the attack, although the New York Times reported that it had been acknowledged by “unnamed Israeli officials”.

Now the world is holding its breath as the Netanyahu government delivers on its pledge to respond to Iran’s retaliation and escalates the prospect of spiraling tit-for-tat violence.

The Biden administration must be privately furious. Having urged the Netanyahu government to accept the ‘win’ following the Iranian drone and missile attack last week, the Israel Prime Minister’s latest actions risk a wider regional war and a steep hike in oil prices in what is an American presidential election year.

Iran and Israel’s enmity stretches back to the Iranian revolution of 1979. The revolution transformed Iran from a repressive Western-aligned monarchy into an ideologically-expansionist Islamic theocracy looking to position itself as a leader amongst the Muslim masses in the Middle East, and the wider world.

Opposing the existence of a Jewish state at the heart of the Muslim world was a central tenet of the Iranian regime’s ideology from the outset.

But as fiery as Iran’s anti-Israeli rhetoric was, it was also mostly abstract to begin with, with few concrete opportunities to actively engage with Israel in a military sense.

This changed with the collapse of the Lebanese state in 1975 and the eventual emergence of an Israel-adjacent proxy in the form of Hezbollah about ten years later.

Along with the emergence of Hezbollah, change has also arrived over the years in the form of expanded missile capabilities for the Islamic State. Forged during the 1980’s in the heat of the battle with Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, Iran’s missile forces continued to develop after the war finished in 1988.

Furthermore, the US’ 2003 invasion of Iraq – a traditional counterweight to Iranian power and influence in the Middle East – had the unintended consequence of inflating Teheran’s regional influence.

The exact proportions of Iran’s missile forces are difficult to pinpoint. A report published by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) estimated that Iran had “several hundred” short-range ballistic missiles with ranges between 300 and 1000 km, and “dozens” with ranges of 1000 – 3000 km

More recently it has developed an indigenous drone capability – including the supply of large numbers of Shahed-131 and Shahed-136 drones to Russia to aid in its war with Ukraine. Clearly, Iran used only a fraction of its available forces in the attack on Israel.

This has been conducted alongside progress in developing a nuclear capability. Progress that was halted temporarily by the lifting of sanctions under President Obama, before being resumed once the deal was abrogated by President Trump.

Israel has designated Iran an existential threat and taking a number of covert measures to retard the development of nuclear weapons by Iran. These include the assassination of Iranian scientists working on the nuclear programme and using a software virus to damage Iranian centrifuges.

Although it has not been officially acknowledged, Israel is widely understood to have a nuclear arsenal with around 200 warheads and missiles with an outer range of 4,800 km.

And therein lies the most frightening aspect of the current face-off between Iran and Israel. In the near term, both may be nuclear powers with missiles. Unlike the Cold War confrontation between the US and USSR, the distances are much shorter; the scope for miscalculation and inadvertent launch much greater.

All eyes are now turned to Israel’s missile strikes on Iran. Israel has been openly discussing and rehearsing an aerial attack on Iran’s nuclear development sites. It now has aircraft – in the form of the F-35 – which can carry out the attack without the need for refuelling.

Israel had shown itself capable of restraint in similar circumstances in the past. During the 1991 Gulf War, Saddam Hussein launched 39 scud missiles against Israel, hoping to spark a surge in support from the Muslim world. Israel did not respond directly, relying instead on US-led coalition air forces to attack Iraqi launch sites.

The calculus is different this time around. An unpopular and isolated government in Israel may well decide that a broadening of the conflict with Iran will serve its interests.

So, what to make of it all from a New Zealand perspective? New Zealand’s trade with both Israel and Iran is modest. However, about 20 percent of the country’s oil imports – which are refined in Singapore – are derived from the Middle East

The biggest takeaway for New Zealand from the confrontation between is that the US-dominated international order we have known since the end of the Cold War is waning.

The US may still be the most powerful country on earth in economic and military terms, but it is less powerful relative to its peers than it was a decade ago.

More significantly, its appetite to lead has diminished markedly.

The MAGA movement in the US which so surprises and appals observers in other liberal democracies has unabashed isolationism as a central tenet. A desire to put America first after years of what are seen to be fruitless wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Open military confrontation between Iran and Israel, Israel’s military onslaught in Gaza, Houthi missile attacks, the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and tensions over Taiwan are all symptoms of the erosion of international law and return of the ‘might is right’ maxim.

Where the presence of US power would have once generated enough misgivings to forestall action there is now a gathering void.

New Zealand, like all other small and middle powers, must reckon on this new international situation and be prepared to take greater responsibility for protecting its interests and values in a clear-eyed fashion.

Jeremy Hall wrote his MA on US-Iran relations and Robert G. Patman is an Inaugural Distinguished Chair and specialist on international relations at the University of Otago.

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