NATO’s Future in Asia

NATO’s 75th-anniversary summit in Washington, celebrated in early July, was unusual not only because of the extraordinary longevity of the alliance but also because of the attention paid to ‘threats’ posed by powers i.e., China, from far outside of its geographical focus in Europe. NATO chiefs indicted China for supporting Russia in Ukraine. But the Ukraine conflict is expected to be only a prelude to the alliance’s adventures outside of Europe. The summit confirmed a deliberate expansion of the alliance into Asia. A quote from the Washington-summit joint declaration says it all:

“The Indo-Pacific is important for NATO, given that developments in that region directly affect Euro-Atlantic security. We welcome the continued contributions of our Asia-Pacific partners to Euro-Atlantic security. We are strengthening dialogue to tackle cross-regional challenges … These projects will enhance our ability to work together on shared security interests.”

This is a major upgrade from NATO’s 2019 summit in London, in which the alliance’s officials described China, for the first time, as a “challenge.” In 2021, NATO once again called China a “systematic challenge” that needed to be tackled collectively. In 2024, this ‘collectivity’ has been defined in terms of its growing ties with Asian countries to counter the emerging Russia-China-North Korea nexus, generating concern that this alliance will come to dominate the Asia-Pacific region. Although NATO is not actually looking for members from Asia, it has expressed its willingness to expand military-to-military cooperation with countries such as Japan and South Korea.

This expansionist policy comes at a time when NATO is also facing trouble at home. Since February 2022, it has been (indirectly) fighting Russia in Ukraine. Just before the Russia-Ukraine military conflict began, there existed serious doubts about NATO’s viability in Europe. France’s Macron called it “brain dead,” with the then-Trump administration in the US also pushing itself away over the fact that the US contributed more than 60 percent of the alliance’s budget. While the Biden administration was able to underplay the significance of the US’s asymmetrical relationship, this issue is all set to become central should Donald Trump return to the US presidency. Can NATO survive a second Trump presidency, especially with JD Vance, a strong critic of US support for Ukraine and NATO, as his running mate?

There are no easy answers yet, but NATO is already trying to ‘Trump-proof’ itself, including by meeting with officials of the Trump campaign to get a sense of Trump’s foreign policy priorities.

It is my understanding that NATO’s ‘China indictment’ is probably also part of NATO’s unwritten and undeclared ‘Trump-proofing’ efforts. With Trump being a strong critic and opponent of China and as the initiator of the ‘trade war’ on China as well, NATO’s growing focus on China might help, from the alliance’s perspective, to retain (President) Trump’s interest in the alliance. In other words, the Trump administration might be willing to keep the US-NATO ties fully functional i.e., as they are today, if he can be convinced that NATO has a future in the Asia-Pacific region against China.

In fact, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg’s recent article in Foreign Affairs can be read as an effort to keep NATO strong to face what he described as an “increasingly dangerous world” being fashioned by the Russia-China alliance. Will Trump and Vance listen to him? There are only uncertain answers.

But this is not the only issue worrying NATO. More importantly, will countries in the Asia-Pacific region also endorse its new mission against Russia and China, and jump on the bandwagon of transatlantic security that, instead of finding new members, will make its presence visible and potent through increasing coordination along defense lines? In short, will countries in the Asia-Pacific region be willing to ‘NATOize’ their defense and foreign policies?

For one thing, NATO’s prospects in Asia are seriously undermined by the more than strong possibility of Trump’s victory in November. Will we see the same enthusiasm in the pro-US Asia-Pacific capitals Tokyo, Seoul, and Canberra, that we see today if and when NATO skeptics and critics assume power? Before the Washington summit, South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol’s principal deputy national security adviser, Kim Tae-hyo, told reporters that the president will bring to Washington “a strong message regarding the military cooperation between Russia and North Korea and discuss ways to enhance cooperation among NATO allies and Indo-Pacific partners”.

Still, there are many states in the region that are far from enthusiastic. The region also includes states like India and Indonesia that still take pride in the Cold War era ‘Non-Alignment Movement’ (NAM). When India’s Modi recently visited Russia, he took all possible steps that could be expected at this stage to further Russia’s agenda of a multipolar world order. Apart from reinforcing the settlement of bilateral trade payments in national currencies, Modi also confirmed his participation in the upcoming BRICS summit in Kazan, Russia in October.

Indonesia’s Prabowo is also reported to have rejected the “Cold War mentality,” and the Philippines’ Marcos, despite his country’s well-known military ties with the US, thinks that “we are determined as a group in ASEAN and in the Indo-Pacific, those around the Indo-Pacific, despite all of this conflict we are determined to stay away from” the “Cold War type of scenario where you have to choose one side or the other.”

A more accurate description of these countries’ policy seems to be limited to using their defense with the US, rather than NATO, to counterbalance China. There is no desire to de-couple from China given significant and growing trade ties. Yet, because Washington repeatedly frames its policies towards Beijing in terms of permanent de-coupling, it enables China to actually frame the US and the West as the aggressor. Right after the Washington summit, a spokesperson for Beijing’s mission to the European Union said NATO should “stop hyping up the so-called China threat and provoking confrontation and rivalry, and do more to contribute to world peace and stability.”

This counter-narrative seems to have found a significant place in the region. A 2024 Pew survey found that a median of 61 percent across 10 Asia-Pacific countries say China contributes to global peace and stability a great deal or a fair amount. This positive view is also tied to China’s deep economic ties with countries in this part of the world.

Therefore, even if NATO can somehow survive the Trump-Vance duo, it doesn’t have a bright future. Given the depth of China’s economic presence, NATO is handicapped by the conspicuous absence of any comparable Western program of economic connectivity and trade. Still, a Trump presidency would favor ‘economic nationalism’ and protection over multilateralism and open markets with little to no tariffs. China, therefore, is unworried at the moment.

Dr Salman Rafi Sheikh is an Assistant Professor of Politics at the Lahore University of Management Sciences (LUMS) in Pakistan. He is a long-time contributor to Asia Sentinel