Before I start on an examination of the HMNZS Manawanui fiasco – because that is what it is, a fiasco – a little background to where I’m coming to this from. My experience as a mariner was primarily rowing a 12 foot fryan dinghy solo around Shoal Bay in the inner Waitemata harbour as a teenager in the late 80’s making my own maps of the sand bars and mangroves so I don’t hold myself out as an expert on seamanship or hydrographic charting, however it did give me an appreciation of the serenity of the sea and of its dangers.
A sudden change in wind speed or direction and your plans had to change with it. Faced with a kilometre of open water to navigate to get home (we had a boat ramp and lived on the Northern edge of Bayswater opposite the Onewa lagoon) when the wind picked up and the tide was falling the anxiety occasionally bordered on panic, but I made it back safely each time albeit exhausted and/or soaked and/or late. Fishing excursions with Dad, and a 15hp Yamaha, could take us out to Rangitoto or Browns Island in the outer harbour, or all the way back beneath the Greenhithe bridge and halfway to Riverhead where the water became fresh. Those voyages gave me both a fear and respect for the sea and for his seamanship. His fearless charging, full throttle, against the current, in a cross wind, waves higher than we could see above as we negotiated our way under the harbour bridge was harrowing – I honestly thought we would be swamped and drowned that day, it was terrifying. He never waivered, he trusted his own judgement and we made it back into the bay with only the loss of my nerve.
In all these adventures it was the things that happened at night that were most exciting. ‘Strange things happen at sea’ it is said, and it gets even stranger at night. Phosphorescence, weird movements in the water, seabirds randomly attacking, all manner of freakish happenings occur on the sea at night. Inexplicable things. The lights from the shore, from lighthouses, beacons and other boats. It can all be quite magical without digressing into a Joseph Conrad passage about it. You get my drift(!).
So it was with great shock and bewilderment I listened to the first news report of the Manawanui disaster. How can such a big vessel get into that much trouble. When you pass close by a ship of that size, or bigger, in a 12ft aluminium dinghy, or even in something much larger like the Devonport ferries as we would do traversing the Waitemata and the shipping lanes, they are gigantic, looming monstrosities. The idea that they could be damaged, let alone sink, just because of some relatively shallow pieces of rock seems unthinkable. Yet here we are. We saw the video. She’s completely gone.
The press conference on Sunday at the Devonport Naval Base with Defence Minister Judith Collins and Chief of Navy Rear Admiral Garin Golding was far short of satisfactory, indeed it displayed a woeful complacency that afflicts every aspect of the New Zealand Government and perhaps also its armed services.
I will pose the questions and attempt to construct a scenario as best I can, I won’t labour the very obvious – that we don’t know all the facts yet – but some inferences may still be drawn. The notion the Captain is experienced is not true. She is less than two years in that role. Would we call someone with less than two years being a truck driver or pilot or trial lawyer very experienced just because they had previously had ten or even more years as a cab driver or a flight planner or a conveyancing lawyer? No, the relevant experience is still only less than two years. It does her no favours to overstate it as they have done.
The praise for her evacuation order is based on no fatalities, but this is premature – that’s only one metric and the facts aren’t in. What about her actions before and during this episode? They have enough information to praise her for one action but not enough to say either way on anything else. Remember Winston Churchill was responsible for the most successful evacuation of all time retreating from Gallipoli but was also rightly castigated in a board of inquiry into the invasion itself and consequently resigned.
To the substantive matters.
Addressing the position of the ship and the reason it was there. It was very close to the reef – the known very obvious reef. Sunset was at 6:24pm and the incident occurred therefore just as twilight was going to total darkness. The breaking waves of the reef (tide info below) would have been visible in the conditions that night. They said in the presser the ship was not doing a survey task at the time, however the “Initial Statement” put out by NZDF on Saturday night (05/10/2024) said ” The incident occurred on Saturday evening while conducting a reef survey.” So what is true? Was it or wasn’t it? Why would it be doing a survey so close to reefs at night?
Collins has said yesterday that the area was being surveyed for the purpose of the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting to take place next month. King Charles is staying at a resort nearby. We can conclude then that the reason the ship was there was to survey in advance of that and essentially for security purposes so the UK vessels (the patrol vessel HMS Tamar was in Apia and came to assist) could safely navigate close in to shore to protect His Majesty and other VIPs.
The chronology of events was covered in the press conference. Samoa local time:
6:46pm ship grounded.
7:52pm order to abandon ship given.
1am first people rescued from life rafts.
5:35am all people rescued.
6:40am smoke from ship, listing heavily.
9:00am capsized sinks below waterline.
However another report from NZ Herald’s Pasifika section editor referencing the statement on Youtube from the Samoan acting PM (in Samoan) has a slightly different timeline:
6:58pm Samoan authorities receive call from Rescue co-ordination centre in Wellington alerting them of distressed vessel. Samoa maritime unit dispatched immediately.
7:19pm Wellington calls again to say ship will be abandoned “onto life rafts due to the deteriorating situation with HMNZS Manawanui taking in too much water and was sinking.”
There are discrepancies between the times of when the ship was abandoned. At the press conference it was claimed an effort was made to get the ship off the reef and that failed. If that was correct – and many things in that presser almost certainly were not accurate so there is no reason to prefer their version over the Samoan report – then whatever was done to get the ship off the reef happened before 7:19pm.
I checked both weather and tides after hearing the news on Sunday and discussed this with an ex-military contact on Twitter. He couldn’t understand why they did not wait for high tide which would have been at approximately 8:30pm before attempting to get off the reef. The weather readings were not extreme – it wasn’t a storm – but there was gusting winds and a warning about currents. Was it the “heavy seas” claimed? The picture of one of the rescue craft taken that night showed it was not, the waves were not evident, and the conditions early at sunrise were only slightly choppy with evidence of a strong breeze from the smoke trail.
Addressing the fire and the smoke. That appears to have happened during the morning, not at the time of the grounding or before. Most likely the electricity, fuel and gas was not, or could not be, turned off properly or secured during the evacuation and that the incoming water and listing created the conditions for ignition. None of the personnel looked to have or reported to have burns or smoke inhalation. I think we can confidently rule out fire as a cause of this incident.
Collins has been saying yesterday on various media interviews that a “power failure” occurred and has put that out as a probable reason for the grounding. As everyone has replied: then drop anchor! That is the standard procedure and given the proximity to the reefs it would be the most obvious thing to do. The silence around details such as this do not inspire confidence, do they. Did they drop anchor(s) but it dragged? Were they so close to the reef that it made no difference? Or, more likely, they did not drop anchor because they just ran right into the reef? Power failure or not they were far too close to the reef.
To me the 7:19pm Samoan report is definitive – it was taking on water and sinking. Given the time delay between the ship and Wellington back to Samoa (12 minutes for the original grounding signal) then it may have only been a matter of half an hour. Collins saying in the presser they tried to get her off may also contradict the loss of power (unless bow thrusters involved?) however it may also be and maybe more likely that the manoeuvre to get her off is what ruptured the hull and made her sink – as discussed with my ex-military contact. Maybe the decision was not to wait for the high tide in two hours because the wind sheer was forcing her into a worse position? It is very murky. And no matter what the cause was 100% preventable.
Side issues.
The NZDF website states the core crew as 39, bunks 66. The NZDF initially said on its website there were 78 aboard. This changed later to 75 personnel. So why have more personnel than bunks? Were they sleeping in the same bunks in shifts? Why have so many aboard? Were some supposed to be taken off somehow – in tenders or in helicopters? Why so many?
Insurance was raised at the presser and neither of them claimed they knew. This must be a flat lie because there is no way the Chief of Navy at least would not know. It only came out yesterday that there is a form of insurance akin to third-party, but what does that mean? Collins really was drastically incompetent at that presser.
The statements from Collins and then later by the typically hyperbolic Luxon about the amazing, incredible, great response capabilities of Maritime NZ is also nonsense. When the Jodi F Millemium sunk and spilled oil off Gisborne a decade or so ago we had to wait a fortnight for a vessel to come from Queensland to deal with it. Nothing has changed that I have seen. The vaunted spill team is oversold – they will only be able to deal with a small scale event. They will spray dispersant if it is a big problem. As for salvage… the Manawanui was the Navy’s salvage vessel.
As for the inquiry, I suspect it may be prone to an arse-covering the likes of which we have come to expect. An incident with HMNZS Te Kaha smacking into the Kauri Point armament depot wharf earlier this year is a case study. I read the report. The ship overshot the wharf by 115 metres and the report says one of the two Ports of Auckland tugs “allegedly” didn’t follow orders. Sounds to me they tried to blame the tug, but the report writer doesn’t buy it. The report is critical of bad record keeping in the logs and notes the bridge voice recording couldn’t be retrieved (how convenient!). What are the chances nothing by way of evidence can be recovered from Manawanui to prove anything? Did Commander Gray take the log book with her (as required surely)?
Having laid that all out I’m glad all are safe. I saw the picture Luxon posted early this morning receiving the crew back in Auckland and he and Collins looked delighted. However it was a disaster – a humiliating and expensive fiasco – nothing of the “triumph” Collins had made it out to be. New Zealand and the Royal New Zealand Navy are an international laughing stock.
