State Papers reveal the RUC noted how professional loyalist terrorists had become in dealing with police
Detectives were immediately suspicious and later discovered that loyalist paramilitaries had learnt from republican terrorists who had adopted strict protocols in a bid to frustrate forensic harvesting by Royal Ulster Constabulary technical experts.
Secret documents released as part of the State Papers by the National Archive revealed the RUC noted how professional loyalist terrorists had become in dealing with police interrogators.
One document noted that loyalist paramilitaries were now adopting methods from the republican operational handbook.
This ranged from taking a shower immediately after an attack to destroy any traces of forensics, burning clothing and destroying vehicles used in the attack.
Loyalist paramilitaries were also clearly trained in interrogation techniques to help them better cope with RUC investigators.
However, one declassified document noted that such behaviour was out of the norm for some terrorists – with one falling foul of the techniques given his known personal habits.
The man had taken a shower immediately after a loyalist terror operation in compliance with anti-forensics guidelines. However, the man was on bail – and then had to attend an RUC station to sign on.
The man arrived at the RUC station still wet from the shower and detectives were immediately suspicious.
“The person in question was not known for his regular bathing habits,” one file noted.
He was arrested and questioned about recent loyalist attacks.
Another file indicated that RUC officers were hopeful of a successful prosecution, given the timing of the incident.
Files also noted that loyalists had evolved a more nuanced political philosophy. Whereas loyalists had traditionally based their political outlook on continued union with Britain and an aversion to the Republic of Ireland and Catholicism, republicanism had a far more complex political and cultural philosophy.
Republican prisoners in Northern Ireland were encouraged to attend Irish language and history classes as well as political discussion groups.
In contrast, loyalist prisoners tended in the 1970s to focus on military drills and sports.
Documents from the 1990s indicated that both London and Dublin were aware of a development within loyalism of a more detailed political and philosophical outlook.
One document indicated this was a response to what they considered to be the “pan-nationalist front”.
Critically, some loyalist paramilitaries argued that while Sinn Féin personnel had always been considered to be legitimate targets, if Sinn Féin was co-operating with the SDLP and the Irish Government, officials with both would, by extension, become targets as well.
One document warned that, irrespective of the political ideology, the motivation for some loyalist groups was quite simple.
“In the final analysis, recruits join the UVF to shoot people,” one expert noted.
However, documents revealed the Irish government held a number of loyalist leaders in high regard, including David Ervine and Billy Hutchinson of the PUP, which was linked to the UVF, Gary McMichael and Davy Adams of the UDP, which represented the UDA.
In 1996, there was increasing pressure on the loyalist ceasefire after the IRA had ended its own ceasefire because of the failure to achieve a breakthrough in the peace talks.
Mr Ervine was quoted by one Irish civil servant as saying some loyalist paramilitaries wanted to target the Republic.
“The trouble we have been having trying to keep them away from the Border,” the PUP official warned.
Mr Ervine also admitted to Irish officials that he feared “elements in British intelligence were attempting to undermine their position in the talks”.
While the loyalist political groups played a crucial role in delivering the Good Friday Agreement, over future years their influence was not as pronounced as many had predicted.
Matters were further complicated by a lethal dispute between rival loyalist paramilitary groups after 2000.
However, there was clear respect between the loyalist and republican paramilitary leaders.
Mr Hutchinson singled out Sinn Féin’s Gerry Kelly for “keeping the (republican) nutcases in check” during the Holy Cross dispute.
Almost a decade after the Good Friday Agreement, Martin McGuinness was said to be aggrieved by the prospect of David Ervine being forced out of politics. He hailed the PUP official as “one of the good guys”.