Cas Mudde: In 2025, Europe must learn to stand on its own two feet

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A popular belief holds that the European Union (EU) makes its greatest progress in times of crisis. If this is true, 2025 will undoubtedly become a great year for “Europe”. Unfortunately, this belief is primarily held inside the Brussels Bubble, where it is grounded more in wishful thinking than in political reality. Most “progress” that the EU achieves during “crises” is either pushing the problem further down the road or coming up with a solution that inevitably creates a future problem. 

That next year will create yet another “crisis”, or at least major challenge, for the EU is almost certain. As 2024 ends, the governments in both France and Germany, together the so-called “engine of European integration”, have lost their parliamentary majority and function as lame-duck administrations.

Germany will hold crucial elections in February 2025, but while the polls show a clear winner, the Christian Democratic CDU-CSU, coalition formation will be difficult given the strength of the far-right AfD – one of the few far-right parties still to face a cordon sanitaire in Europe. In contrast, French president Emmanuel Macron remains stubbornly committed to coalition governments that lack a viable parliamentary majority.

As is often the case when faced with a lack of progress on the domestic front, Macron is turning his attention to foreign policy, especially European policy. Bypassing Germany, particularly over the war in Ukraine, he is increasingly seeking support in Central and Eastern Europe, particularly in Poland, with the enthusiastic support of the new EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Estonian anti-Russian hawk Kaja Kallas. But despite the enthusiasm for a continued tough stance on Russia and strong support for Ukraine among some regional leaders, the strongest opposition also comes from this region (notably Hungary and Slovakia).

Of course, the real challenge for the EU comes from Washington, DC, where Donald Trump returns to power on 20 January. While Trump has no vision for an alternative world order, he has staked much of his political reputation on “bringing peace” to Ukraine – and on ensuring that the US stops paying billions of dollars to that country. On Europe, Trump is the anti-Joe Biden, a Cold War era transatlantic believer, who was out of step with even many in his own party and electorate. For Trump, Europe is a competitor first and an ally second. Similarly, NATO is more a of protection racket than a collective security alliance.

The EU is losing both its strongest foreign supporter and its strongest foreign protector at a time when it is more divided than ever and its traditional “engine” is running out of fuel