The world’s attention is currently focussed on the Middle East, where Israel and Iran are involved in a dangerous round of escalation and retaliation. Meanwhile, Ukraine’s battle continues and this week Russia captured the town of Vuledhar. A tactical loss, that although expected, will still be felt by Ukraine. Vuledhar sits on high ground at the junction of the Zaporizhia and Donetsk Oblast border and the town has repelled many Russian attacks before being slowly enveloped.
Vuledhar’s loss is unfortunate because it ‘plays to’ the narrative that Russian victory is inevitable, that by continuing to throw manpower and artillery ammunition into the battle, Russia will eventually overwhelm Ukraine. A narrative Russia exploits to its advantage and undermine international support for Ukraine.
The truth is more nuanced, Ukraine is smaller than Russia and struggles to match its larger neighbour but this does not mean defeat is inevitable. History provides many examples of smaller nations defeating vastly larger opponents. This campaign is currently at a pivot point, strategically Russia is losing the war. It is running out of equipment like tanks, trucks, artillery guns and armoured vehicles and its defence industry is not producing replacements. Russia’s best soldiers have been killed or crippled and even with help from allies like China, it will take years to recover. Additionally, the war has re-invigorated NATO and put Europe on the defensive. More importantly, the war has revealed Russia’s weakness and Russia will now always be the subservient partner in its relationship with China.
However, campaigns are won at the operational-level of war by capturing ground, and Russia continues to slowly advance in many areas. The key questions are if and when, Russia’s strategic-level issues impact on the operational-level of the campaign.
The operational-level situation
At operational-level the mechanics of the campaign are relatively simple, Russia is trying to capture all of Donetsk. In order to achieve this goal earlier this year it re-organised its Central Grouping of Forces, responsible for the relevant section of the frontline. Then conducted a series of attacks to find a weak point in Ukraine’s eastern defences. Starting at Chasiv Yar and moving generally south, Russia slowly confirmed a main axis of attack on the town of Pokrovsk. Russia’s likely goal is to capture all of Dontesk Oblast, including the last large towns remaining in Ukrainian hands, Sloviansk and Kramatorsk.
Ukraine responded to these activities by developing a plan to divert Russian resources and reserves away from this section of the frontline. This plan involved an attack across the Russian border into Kursk Oblast. The attack was sudden and successful, led by experienced and well-equipped Ukrainian units, factors that indicate it was well-planned. It is likely that this offensive is coordinated at operational-level with Ukraine’s defence of Donetsk and is part of the strategy of attrition described by General Syrskyi, immediately after his appointment. Essentially, by drawing Russian reserves away from battles in Donetsk, Ukraine is fixing Russian forces in defensive battles that will attrit them. By reducing it reserves, Russian withdrawal or manoeuvre becomes difficult for forces already committed to attacks. Russian forces that are stuck, or fixed and be targeted more effectively.
This activity is taking place alongside the onset of winter, when bad weather will make large-scale operations difficult for a couple of months. In Ukraine, winter tends to freeze military activity and he season is used to re-organise and recover before Summer.
Therefore, since August when Ukraine launched its attack into Kursk. The key operational-level question is whether this attack will draw away enough Russian reserves to impact the fighting in Donetsk. And, at this stage, we still don’t know.
However, there are some observations that can be made indicating how the campaign is developing. The first is that Ukraine’s land activity is clearly coordinated with a programme of deep-strikes behind Russian lines, Ukraine switching its air campaign’s main effort from oil infra-structure to supporting the land campaign. A change indicating sophisticated planning that is probably designed to achieve three objectives:
Interdict the flow of Russian artillery ammunition and glide bombs. Since August, Ukraine is targeting large second-line ammunition depots behind the border, conducting approximately 13 successful attacks, including the spectacular destruction of 30,000 tons of ammunition at Toropets on 18 September. Most attacks are closer to Ukraine, specifically targeting sites in Belgorod, Rostov and Kasnodar Krai Oblasts.
Degrade Russian air defences. Ukraine continues to target Russian air defence radars and missiles accounting for two advanced S-300 missiles launchers and a very advanced Nebo-M radar system in the last two months.
Interdicting the supply of fuel to the frontline. Ukraine continues to attack Russian oil infra-structure but in recent months is concentrating on depots supporting the land campaign. Like targeting an oil depot in Voronezh Oblast on 4 October and an oil depot in Belgorod on 28 August.
Ukraine’s target selection since August indicates that the land campaign is currently Ukraine’s main effort, and all military functions are directed at reducing Russian combat power on the frontline. This adds weight to the hypothesis that at operational-level Ukraine is either aiming to deal a significant blow against Russia. Likewise, it could also indicate a very high-level of concern.
The second observation is that regardless of capturing Vuledhar, Russia’s rate of advance has slowed down. Commentators like the Institute for the Study of War, on 3 October, point out that “The Russian military command prepared the ongoing Russian summer 2024 offensive operation for months in advance and accumulated operational reserves and resources for the operation that the recent months of attritional fighting have likely heavily degraded.” Essentially, that Russian has put a lot of its ‘eggs in the Donetsk basket,’ committing forces that it probably cannot replace. So even if Ukraine gives ground tactically in places like Vuledhar, the operational-level impact is unlikely to be significant because Russia is losing resources it cannot replace, General Syrskyi’s stated intent. Ukraine trading ground for time, and inflicting significant losses on Russia.
Tactical-level battles, will they impact at the operational or strategic level?
Currently, several tactical-level battles are being fought along the frontline. My assessment of the situation and development of each is as follows:
Kursk
Ukraine’s offensive in this area has probably culminated, and Ukraine is unlikely to advance further. Russian forces continue to hold open a withdrawal route for forces that were initially trapped between Ukrainian troops and the Syem River.
However, in the larger operational-level scheme of manoeuvre this force is achieving its objective, providing a constant dilemma for Russian commanders. Ukraine’s occupation of Russian territory is a psychological blow that must be addressed, and this will take resources. It seems likely that Ukraine will be hard to push out a of Kursk, inflicting more attrition on Russia but this will take time. My assessment is that Ukraine will hold this area until at least early next year, and possibly longer.
Vovchansk
Ukraine is slowly pushing the Russian’s out of the area, in Kharkiv Oblast, near Vovchansk. On 24 September, Ukrainian forces recaptured the Vovchansk Aggregate Plant. Progress is slow but it is likely that Ukraine will remove Russian forces from this area relatively soon.
Kupyansk
Last week, Russia made a large advance in this area and appears to be developing an operation advance too, and secure a new line of defence along the Oskil River. My assessment is that Russia is likely to be tactically successful, slowly pushing Ukrainian forces back to the river. However, this tactical-level victory’s only impact at the operational-level is to reduce Russian resources elsewhere.
Vuledhar
After two years of intensive fighting, and losing battalions worth of armour and soldiers, Russia has enveloped Vulehar. The impact of this loss is hard to interpret because the town sits on high ground and controls important roads. This is an area to watch because if, contrary to my assessment, Russia does have useful reserves available, this may be an area where they could be employed.
Pokrovsk
Russia continues to slowly advance around Pokrovsk, ‘filling in the gaps,’ expanding its salient but not committing to an assault on the town. This is a sensible course of action because as I have described in previous articles advancing on Pokrovsk from the east is a tough challenge. Russia’s loss of forward momentum in this area is important though, because capturing Pokrovsk is the only current tactical battle in which victory could be leveraged into operational-level success. Pokrovsk’s position on high ground, dominating road and rail networks means it could serve as a firm base for capturing more of Donetsk.
Combining this information about Pokrovsk value with Russia’s demonstrably slow advance, we could speculate that Russia does not currently have the combat power to take Pokrovsk. Therefore, I suggest keeping an eye on Pokrovsk, to see if it is captured. My assessment is that it won’t be and that instead Russia’s offensive will culminate before the winter.
Summary
Ukraine’s key threat at this point it time is not Russia, last week Russia won a tactical victory at Vuledhar and in coming weeks may gain ground in other places. However, the key point is that Russia is far from winning any operational-level victory. On 5 September, President Zelensky estimated that 60,000 Russian soldiers had been redirected from Zaporizhia and Kherson to Kursk. He also claimed that the number of Russia shells used in these areas was decreasing.
While we must take these statements with a ‘grain of salt,’ a month later, Russia’s progress remains minimal indicating that Ukraine’s plan is probably working. Russian casualties continue to mount at a rate of about 1000-1,100 soldier per day, and Open-Source Intelligence shows diminishing Russian war stocks of tanks, armoured vehicles and artillery. Putin’s 2024 budget enormously increases defence expenditure, which did not end well for the Soviet Union.
Russia is not Ukraine’s greatest threat; it is the commitment of its supporters and now more than ever it is important that the countries supporting Ukraine are diverted by other conflicts. The battle for Ukraine, is a battle for long-term peace because if Ukraine and the liberal democracies that support it fail it empowers authoritarian states around the world to be aggressive, assuming that they can outlast democratic states.
Ben Morgan is a bored Gen Xer, a former Officer in NZDF and TDBs Military Blogger – his work is on substack
