Although fighting continued along the frontline there was no operationally significant movement this week, providing an opportunity to record tactical lessons from the last six months. At strategic level, there was interesting news this week. Putin publicly discussing long-term strategy, providing interesting insight and context for discussing the tactical lessons recorded in this column.
Putin talks strategy
Speaking at the St Petersburg Economic Forum on 7 June, Putin articulated his strategy for the war in Ukraine. He outlined a strategy of incremental attrition based on continuous small offensives designed to wear Ukraine down and outlast the goodwill of the nation’s supporters. A strategy he stressed did not require another large mobilisation of reservists.
The statements are also notable because Putin appeared to re-negotiate the conditions for victory. Articulated as ‘squeezing’ the Ukrainians out “of those territories that should be under Russian control,” an interesting and subtle distinction. Putin did not discuss regime change or ‘denazification’ in terms that indicate the complete subjugation of Ukraine. Instead, it appears that the focus of the campaign will be the areas that have been annexed by Russia; Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia and Crimea. This position concurs with previous statements regarding the recent Kharkiv offensive’s objectives being limited to creating a buffer zone for Belgorod. Additionally, the focus on long-term attrition coincides with the appointment of Andrey Belousov as defence minister in May.
Putin’s words are important because they contribute to a view posited by some observers for a long-time, that Russia no longer has the combat power to return to operational level manoeuvre. Essentially, that Russia’s ground forces can only operate at a tactical level slowly pushing forward small forces in ‘bounds,’ measured in hundreds of metres, rather than being able to manoeuvre decisively. Characteristically, Putin is confident pitching his strategy as an economic way to wait out the weak liberal democracies that support Ukraine.
Further evidence of Russia’s strategic weakness can be found in other statements, during a panel discussion at the forum, on 5 June, Putin discussed nuclear weapons in relatively ambiguous terms. He said Russia did not need to use them in Ukraine but highlighted the large number of tactical nuclear weapons Russia has compared to NATO’s reserves. He also discussed potential changes to Russia’s nuclear policy, the two statements ensuring the ‘nuclear stick’ remains visible to foreign observers.
Putin also threatened Ukraine’s supporters, indicating that a Russian response to the recent removal of restrictions on using long-range missiles supplied to Ukraine could be to provide similar weapons to nations that are confronting Ukraine’s supporters. Putin stating “We are not supplying those weapons yet, but we reserve the right to do so to those states or legal entities which are under certain pressure, including military pressure, from the countries that supply weapons to Ukraine and encourage their use on Russian territory.” The deployment of Russian long-range weapons overseas in numbers seems unlikely because they are needed to prosecute the war in Ukraine. However, this policy could increase instability in the world’s trouble spots and is likely to be more dangerous than Russia’s nuclear dialogue.
It appears that Putin has accepted that his land forces are not capable of operational manoeuvre. So, his options are limited to either destroying the Russian economy by mobilising completely to rebuild an army capable if operational manoeuvre; or to stagnate into a long slow ‘forever war,’ hoping to wait out Ukraine’s supporters. It seems likely that with his new and more capable advisors, Putin is realising the potential political cost of full mobilisation on the economy and on Russia’s social fabric so has chosen the second option.
Mid-year tactical lessons
Putin’s shrinking goals and potential admission that his land forces are no longer capable of operational or strategic level manoeuvre provides a good opportunity to capture tactical lessons from the last six months of war.
Is air denial the new air superiority in near-peer conflict?
A couple of weeks ago in this column, we discussed the evolving air battle over the frontline (See – ‘Putin knows Russia is in trouble’ dated 27 May 2024). Observing that the air battle in Ukraine is defined by using long-range weapons like Patriot and S300-400 to create air denial zones deep behind the frontline. Ukraine’s ‘Patriot traps’ successfully destroying hard targets like Airborne Early Warning and Command aircraft.
Additionally, long-range missiles like HIMARS and ATACMs are being used to push back the infra-structure required for tactical air-support. Specifically, the enemy’s long-range air defence missile launchers, ground-based surveillance systems, airfields and command points.
Essentially, two key trends are emerging, the first is that the frontline is an increasingly difficult place for crewed aircraft to operate. The accuracy and range of systems like Patriot and S300/400 providing deep anti-air cover, combined with the abundance of accurate and lethal short-range systems makes achieving air-superiority almost impossible. Russian close-air support has played a role in the campaign at key times but cannot achieve a level of air-superiority that enables it to support operational level manoeuvre.
The second trend is that an emerging component of air-superiority on the modern battlefield is Suppression of Enemy Air Defence (SEAD) deep behind the frontline. Using long-range weapons like missiles or drones to specifically target the enemy’s long-range air defence systems. Pushes the SEAD battle many kilometres into depth as both sides hunt each other’s air defence assets.
It seems likely that in any future near-peer conflict, crewed close support aircraft maybe relegated to the sidelines because neither side will be able to achieve the level of air-superiority required for them to operate safely over the battlefield. That instead the frontline air battle will focus on denying airspace to the enemy. A situation that could negate a key aspect of US and its allied forces traditional ‘fires’ (artillery, missiles and air attack) doctrine. This is not inevitable, but military planners need to study this development and plan tactic to defeat air denial operations.
Tube artillery is still a key component of conventional war
Ukraine is a good reminder that the stolid, all-weather dependability of tube artillery remains current. That artillery is still the only type of indirect fire that can provide accurate, long duration suppressive fire regardless of weather. Even light field artillery, towed by trucks is proving its worth in a highly contested and dangerous environment. The gunners evolving new tactics, surviving and providing fire support, that is especially important as both sides tactical air power is currently restricted.
The extensive use of GPS to locate gunlines accurately enables towed artillery to ‘shoot and scoot’ in a manner unimaginable to previous generations. GPS also allows observers whether on the ground; or via drone to accurately locate targets. Combined, these applications of GPS technology vastly increase the chance of first round accuracy, meaning that gunlines can deploy and immediately ‘fire for effect’ increasing their lethality and survivability.
Further, the application of GPS guidance to projectiles vastly increases the lethality of tube artillery and reduces the logistics required to support it. Human nature dictates that shiny new technology appeals to military planners more that old stalwarts like tube artillery, but this war is a reminder to those planning for future conflicts that tube artillery still plays an important role on the battlefield.
Will small attack drones replace tube artillery?
Ukraine’s successful use of First Person View (FPV) drones in place of artillery to break up Russian attacks early in the year demonstrates the potential of these weapons. However, in my opinion tube artillery will have a role on the battle field for some time yet. FPV drones are lethal as well as being easy to move around, however their key weakness is electronic jamming. A weakness that a ‘dumb’ artillery round does not have because once fired an artillery round is impossible to stop.
Another weakness of FPV drones is weather; wind, rain and other atmospheric conditions limit the effectiveness of lightweight drones. Tube artillery is unaffected by weather, being able to provide accurate fire support regardless of rain, wind or snow. Over time, AI will be developed that will allow drones to self-target removing jamming as an effective counter but it seems likely that small FPV drones will always be weather dependent. Therefore, tube artillery will retain a useful role in the foreseeable future albeit working closely with FPV drones.
Turtle tanks are not as silly as they look
Russia’s Turtle tanks are an interesting innovation, specifically their use as a tool for breeching an FPV killing area and as a launch pad for drones. Although, reports are still not confirmed by reputable sources it appears that the ‘barn’ on a Turtle tank can be used to move a swarm of FPV drones close to Ukrainian positions. This idea makes sense and provides another snapshot of potential future battlefields.
It seems likely that FPV drones will soon be engaged by swarms of defensive ‘fighter’ drones and I am especially interested in if air burst artillery is an effective counter for them. So, the idea of being able to move an attack swarm directly onto a target, under armour appears sensible. It will be interesting to see how this concept develops in the future.
Electronic Warfare (EW)
The war demonstrates that dominating the electromagnetic spectrum is increasingly important. Many modern weapons rely on digital networks and this leads to a new battle that involves controlling and dominating the physical infrastructure that supports digital networks. Part of this battle is jamming and disrupting signals but it also includes locating and targeting EW units, electro-magnetic surveillance systems, digital cables and satellite uplinks. An area of operations that will become an increasingly common feature of war-fighting and is likely to lean heavily on both artillery and infantry functions that need to be starting to plan for these roles.
The importance of the infantry soldier
Another six-months of war continues to confirm the importance of the infantry soldier. Even on today’s high-tech battlefield, ground is still held and taken by the foot soldier. Both sides need more infantry and there is a pertinent lesson for the US, NATO and other US allies around the world, that war still requires infantry soldiers. The current clash between aggressive authoritarian regimes and liberal democracies is not going to suddenly disappear and military planners in the world’s liberal democracies need to understand this lesson. Larger regular armies, large reserve forces even national service all need to be considered to provide the infantry required to meet future contingencies.
Summary
Putin’s statements this week should be interpreted as a danger signal. Russia understands its weaknesses and is planning sensibly for a long war. Ukraine and its supporters need to listen carefully and plan to counter this approach, to learn lessons from the war and apply them effectively over a long-period. Already, Russia’s ability to conduct operational level manoeuvre is exhausted and will not be rebuilt at current rates of attrition. Russia can be defeated in Ukraine
However, defeating Russia requires a long-term commitment and that is where the danger lies. This year is an election year across Europe and in the US, Putin knows this and is banking on democracy undermining Ukraine’s supporters. But, if Ukraine’s supporters stand firm, Russia will be worn down further and be forced to give ground. It will not happen immediately, but is inevitable providing Ukraine gets the support it needs.
Ben Morgan is a bored Gen Xer, a former Officer in NZDF and TDBs Military Blogger – his work is on substack
