BEN MORGAN: Analysing the Kursk offensive, Ukraine’s objectives and what’s next

This is an important moment in the war, Ukraine seizing the initiative with surprise and manoeuvre.  Ukraine’s force is currently estimated to be about three to four brigades strong, or around 6000 t0 8000 soldiers supported by hundreds of armoured vehicles. Additionally, Ukraine’s order of battle includes experienced units like the 22nd Mechanised, 88th Mechanised, 80th Air Assault brigades, experienced and high-performing formations.  It is a sizeable force and is well-equipped with modern equipment including strong air defence and engineering assets, including mine laying equipment.

Russia is having difficulty stopping Ukraine’s advance, several sources claiming 1,000 square kilometres of territory has been captured. More than Russia has taken this year. The BBC reports that Ukraine controls 74 settlements and Kursk’s governor has reported that 121,000 people have evacuated the border region. Additionally, there are credible reports that large numbers of Russian soldiers are surrendering.  It seems likely that the advance will be limited by Ukraine’s resources, rather than Russia’s response.  So far, Russia’s response is proving uncoordinated and ineffective.

Ukraine’s objective, this attack is not about ground

Currently, there is plenty of commentary about the aims of the offensive, that it is targeting airfields, Kursk nuclear power plant or Kursk city. Some commentators, and Putin, state that Ukraine is aiming to capture ground to use as a bargaining chip in future negotiations.

However, I believe that capturing ground is not the objective. Instead, Ukraine’s attack is a response to the threat it faces in Donetsk. Specifically, the recent tactical flexibility demonstrated by Russia’s Central Grouping of Forces in Donetsk, the force’s tactical evolution makes the capture of Pokrovsk and Chasiv Yar more likely. Additionally, the improvement increases the potential for rapid exploitation of any victory, an important town’s capture used as a ‘stepping stone’ for a large advance. This is a threat Ukraine needs to mitigate by drawing Russian reserves away from Donetsk.

Ukraine’s attack is a ‘shaping’ operation designed to reduce the combat power of Russia’s reserve echelons, reducing the chance of them exploiting tactical success. Rather than trying to take ground, Ukraine is aiming to create enough threat and uncertainty that Russian reserves are moved from Ukraine to the border oblasts. Additionally, the attack demonstrates that Ukraine has planned for this contingency, and prepared a force to execute the operation.  Achieving surprise is not easy, and the fact that Ukraine did demonstrates the amount of planning and preparation.

Operational manoeuvre?

General Mick Ryan recently wrote an interesting article relating Ukraine’s attack to Soviet doctrine, noting the similarities between Ukraine’s force, its operation and the Soviet ‘Operational Manoeuvre Group’ (OMG).  The OMG was a combined arms task force constituted for operations deep behind the enemy’s frontline.  In the Soviet context, it was much larger, a multi-division grouping that had true operational-level impact.  The OMG was designed to be a force powerful enough to advance deep behind enemy lines and influence a campaign. Despite the size difference, the OMG is a useful doctrinal model through which to interpret Ukraine’s operation.

A deep, diversionary attack into an enemy’s rear areas was a doctrinal role for an OMG.  A large, balanced force able to operate in depth is very difficult to counter because it can move quickly and its targets are unknown. The OMG’s size and combined arms allowing it considerable freedom of movement. Like Ukraine’s force, OMGs always included engineers allowing it to cross rivers or difficult terrain, or to ‘dig in;’ and fight if required. The Soviet OMG’s size meant that it required a large commitment to defeat.

Ukraine’s force may not be the size of the Soviet OMG but its structure and role are close enough for comparison and consideration.  And, it could be argued that this attack is an example of operational level manoeuvre. Its most important impact is not in Kursk but in how it shapes the battle for Donetsk 360 km to its south-east.

Ukraine has appreciated that Russia’s long and poorly defended border provides opportunity for manoeuvre. Challenging Russian assumptions that Ukraine’s supporters would not allow large-scale cross border operations, probably believing Putin’s nuclear threats scare Ukraine’s supporters. An assumption Ukraine gently tested in 2023, by supporting anti-Putin Russian partizans to attack across the border.  Now, that Ukraine needs to manoeuvre it is taking advantage of this risky Russian assumption.

Here is a link to General Ryan’s article –

Do not overestimate the political or propaganda success of the attack

Plenty of commentary is currently emphasising the political damage this attack is doing to Putin’s regime.  I think this attack is certainly an embarrassing failure of Russia’s military but do not think it will have a strategic political impact.  Putin has already ‘seen off’ Prigozhin’s mutiny and march on Moscow.  Ukraine crossing the border is nowhere near as embarrassing and does not have the political potential of Prigozhin’s activity. In fact, it may strengthen Putin’s position as people’s support coalesces around the nation’s leader.

Additionally, although Ukraine is currently getting plenty of good press in mainstream media and demonstrating that it is still ‘in the fight’ the situation is still risky.  Russia will eventually mobilise the resources to push Ukraine out, and is sure to throw everything at that objective.  It seems unlikely that the operation was conceived to support information operations or is designed to deliver a propaganda victory, especially since there is a pressing military problem that it contributes to solving.

What to expect, Russian failure may create bigger opportunities

My assessment is that this operation will extend into months, at least until the autumn rains start and a rapid exploitation of the situation in Donetsk is less likely.  However, there is an important factor that needs to be considered that could extend the time frame.  Russia’s command and control of the response appears to be failing, the political decision to place the operation under FSB command complicating the military response. The Institute for the Study of War reported on 12 August that “Putin delegated overlapping tasks to the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), Federal Security Service (FSB), and Rosgvardia in the Ukrainian-Russian border area.” Evidence of this dysfunction is provided by the slow response and reports of Russian forces arriving piecemeal and being defeated.

Looking at Russia’s command performance to-date, this situation is likely to take a long time to address, so Ukraine has a ‘window of opportunity’ that it can exploit.  Probably Ukraine’s military staff is coming to terms with the fact that Russia’s command paralysis means that their diversion could safely be extended into a longer operation, perhaps holding ground over the winter.  My guess is that right now there are Ukrainian staff officers furiously looking for defensible lines and at the logistics of supporting a defensive battle to hold ground.

This would be a big ask though, and it is more likely that Ukraine will hold its positions in Kursk only long enough to shape the battle in Donetsk, then withdraw. Retaining sufficient force to ensure Russia needs keep stronger forces on the border, troops that will not be able to be used in Ukraine.  And, that is likely to be the cold, calculus being analysed in Ukraine. Whether it is better to take advantage of Russia’s weakness to seize and hold ground, accepting more casualties. Or, if is better to limit casualties, retain combat power and withdraw.   A tough question.