Russian elections last week, from 15-17 March, were an opportunity for Ukraine to maximise chaos. A task they set about with gusto, Ukrainian drones damaging Russian oil refineries and anti-Putin Russian militias crossing the border to attack villages in Belgorod and Kursk Oblasts. The accession of Sweden into NATO and signs of increased European support for Ukraine combined with Ukrainian air and ground attacks set off another round of Putin’s nuclear rhetoric. Russia’s president also stated he would increase the number of soldiers on the Finnish border. But, the biggest untold story this week is the sudden improvement in Russian deep strike capabilities.
NATO support
Germany, France and Poland issued a joint statement expressing their support for Ukraine and pledging to deliver more equipment and help build the Ukrainian defence industry. Additionally, French President Emmanual Macron is not ‘walking back’ statements about NATO troops deploying to support Ukraine. He qualified his position, a little, stating that this step was ‘not currently required’ but he is continuing to keep discussion about this option alive.
The most important action that Europe took this week was on 15 March, in Brussels, where the European Union’s executive authorised 500 million euros (US$ 545 million) for a project that will streamline the production of artillery shells. The plan is to produce 1.7 million shells by the end of 2024 and to be able to produce 2 million per annum by 2025.
This week NATO flexed its military muscle in its largest exercise since the Cold War. Exercise Steadfast Defender saw the alliance’s border, from northern Finland to Poland, flooded with 90,000 troops and 1,100 combat vehicles. The exercise also included 50 ships and 80 combat aircraft including helicopters and drones. Essentially, it demonstrated NATO’s ability to rapidly deploy substantial manoeuvre forces across Europe, on top of providing its existing garrisons.
NATO is working hard to demonstrate that even if US support is uncertain, Europe is committed to Ukraine. The alliance appears to have realised the threat that Putin’s Russia has become and is keen to deter future aggression.
Ukraine’s election week attacks on Russia
Drone strikes
Ukraine’s offensive against Russia’s oil industry intensified during election week. Dozens of drones attacked a range of targets across Russia. On 12 March, a refinery in Krishi and another in Oryol were badly damaged. Then on 13 March, Ukrainian drones attacked refineries at Ryazan, approximately 180 km south-east of Moscow, Kstovo approximately 400 km east of Moscow and in Rostov-on-Don.
The week’s attacks demonstrated Ukraine’s deep strike capabilities with roughly 1,500 kms separating Rostov-on-Don in the south and Krishi in the north and some targets being about 800km from Ukraine.
The impact of the drone offensive has already forced Russian petrol prices up. Hitting Russian voters in the back pocket. Putin was also forced to extend, by another six months, the ban on exporting refined petroleum products so that domestic prices stay low. In turn, reducing the flow of overseas revenue into Russia. Ukraine’s drone strikes on oil infra-structure appear to be an effective way to rattle Putin. Attacking oil refineries is unlikely to cause many civilian casualties but creates large fires that make for powerful visual images when they are circulated on the internet. Finally, over time Ukraine is influencing production of oil-based products that bring Russia valuable foreign exchange. Some estimates put the current loss of production at 10%.
Ground attacks
Anti-Putin Russian fighters crossed the border again this week, in a repeat of similar attacks last year. Two areas were targeted; Kursk and Belgorod. The attacks are essentially theatre, the forces involved are too small to take and hold ground but the propaganda value is significant. Photos and video footage of Russian ‘freedom fighters’ in action in the villages of Kursk and Belgorod Oblasts remind people in Russia that do not support Putin, that they are not alone. The attacks also demonstrate to people in Russia the relative weakness of the border, undermining Putin’s ‘strong man’ image.
The overall impact
Ukraine’s air and ground attacks clearly shook Putin. In general, the war has recently been moving in his direction. However, the chaos that Ukraine created last week made him react, issuing another round of threatening nuclear rhetoric. However, this is probably directed at Putin’s domestic audience. Putin ‘pointing a finger’ west, and blaming NATO and the US for the attacks. His nuclear threats are designed to reassure Russians that he is a strong man able to defend them from the ‘West.’
If Putin does use nuclear weapons there will probably not be any warning. He will want to maximise the shock effect. However, he is unlikely to do so because NATO has constant air and space surveillance of Ukraine and Russia and will already have detailed contingency plans in place. Putin knows that NATO’s reaction will be immediate, probably as the weapon detonates, NATO aircraft will be in the air heading to their targets. It is likely that across NATO, militaries will already be briefed and ready to respond.
We do not know the details of the response but some options could be sinking the Black Sea Fleet or immediate establishment of a ‘no-fly’ zone over Ukraine. Strong but measured responses to demonstrate NATO resolve and capability, while providing the option to de-escalate. In my opinion it is likely that NATO’s counter strike would be shockingly fast and effective. Aiming to disincentivise further escalation. Putin is smart and has probably done the same analysis and reached a similar conclusion but nuclear rhetoric costs nothing, scares the international community and plays well to his domestic audience.
Russia hits more targets, further behind Ukrainian lines – What is going on?
Ukraine operates just over 20 Patriot air defence missile systems. Patriot is probably the most advanced and well-tested air defence system in the world and can shoot down most targets. It is a valuable and rare piece of equipment. Recently Ukraine has been moving them close to the frontline and using them to snipe key Russian aircraft.
Last week, Russia hit two Patriot launchers with a long-range Iskender missile, guided onto its target by a drone. The launchers were hit, as they moved 40-50km behind the frontline, near a small-town west of Avdiivka called Pokrovsk. The Patriot launchers were probably in this area to attack Russian aircraft bombing Avdiivka, the weapon systems long-range allowing them to hit aircraft over the Sea of Azov and flying from important Russian air bases at Tagnarog and Rostov-on-Don.
In the last couple of weeks Russia is demonstrating increased ‘targeting’ capability. Managing to find important targets and then guide long-range missiles to destroy them. In the last couple of weeks, Russia has destroyed not just the Patriot launchers but also a HIMARS and three helicopters at a forward refuelling and re-arming point. All these attacks were a similar distance behind the frontline and used the same method of attack. These events have not been discussed much in the mainstream media but should ring alarm bells in Ukraine because Russia is demonstrating a new level of capability.
First, larger and more capable Russian drones are reported to be ranging deep behind the frontline. An indication that this is a new operational factor is that the Patriots launchers were moving and did not have air defence covering their movement. A standard procedure for a valuable weapon system like Patriot if there is a significant threat. The same applies for the HIMARs. This observation could indicate that the Ukrainians have poor planning, that they lack air defence resources or that the Russians have made a sudden leap in their surveillance capabilities. Based on the war-to-date the answer is probably a combination of the last two factors. Ukraine has limited resources and as soon as a key system is in a ‘safe’ area, scare air defence assets are quickly redeployed. The risk being that if Russia’s capabilities increase suddenly equipment can be lost.
The second observation is that to-date Russian drones have not demonstrated the ability to guide long-range missiles onto targets. A technically difficult capability that requires relatively large drones that can mount laser designators, can maintain digital communications and are connected to the GPS network. In late 2022, there were reports of Russia using Iranian, Mohajer-6 drones to guide attacks by suicide drones but since then there has been little evidence of deep strikes using this method of attack. Some in the military blogging community are speculating that these attacks are evidence of more Mohajer-6 drones being in service or of newer and more sophisticated Mohajer-10 drones being deployed in Ukraine. However, at this stage deployment of newer more sophisticated drones has not been confirmed.
Russian targeting process improvements
New equipment is only part of the story and Russia’s success striking depth targets in the last couple of weeks is also an indication that their ‘targeting’ systems and processes have improved. Most likely, Russia is forming deep strike teams, by pairing a long-range weapon with specialist ‘Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance’ (ISTAR) teams that find targets. ISTAR assets then provide the constant observation required to guide a missile or drone to hit the target.
Linking ISTAR and long-range weapons shortens the ‘sensor – shooter’ link and allows for rapid engagement of fleeting targets deep behind the lines. This way of operating is unconventional, most armies work hard to centralise and tightly control the use of both ISTAR and long-range weapons. Requests for fire are escalated through layers of command, then triaged at each level to prioritise which targets are most important. This process takes time and during the war Russia has been very poor at shortening the ‘sensor – shooter’ link. A feature of Russian operations early in the war, was that artillery and missiles too a long-time to respond to ‘calls for fire.’ Last week, we noted observations from Avdiivka, confirming improvements in Russian artillery responsiveness on the battlefield.
Now it appears they have formed specialist teams tasked to hunt out and hit key Ukrainian assets like; helicopter, HIMARs and air defence missiles deep behind the frontline. This evolution in capability may rapidly increase Russian combat effectiveness, especially because Ukraine’s best defence against large drones used for depth target acquisition is short-range air defence missiles that are very expensive and may be in short supply.
Summary
The results of Russia’s election will be confirmed as this article is published and are unlikely to be a surprise. The most important observation from the electoral period is that Putin is visibly shaken by NATO’s activities and by Ukraine’s air and ground attacks. Putin’s level of concern being demonstrated by his threats and angry statements. It is obvious that Ukraine’s attacks on Russia’s oil infrastructure are affecting the economy and Putin politically. Additionally, although they are small, the attacks on Belgorod and Kursk Oblasts are embarrassing.
Last week, we discussed the inflection point the ground campaign is reaching and although Russia continues to batter Ukraine’s defences there has not been a breakthrough of the type we identified last week. Every week that passes without a Russian breakthrough, the more ‘the curve’ moves towards Ukraine. Putin’s problem is that Russia is ‘all in,’ aside from manpower Russia will struggle to generate more combat power than it can currently. Russia needs a significant victory before support like European shells and F16s arrives so that politicians in Europe and the US can be convinced that that the war as a lost cause. Each passing week without that victory, entrenches European support and may even bring the US back to the table. At the end of the week, Russia had not broken through and every week that Ukraine holds its line the balance moves slowly in its favour.
Ben Morgan is a bored Gen Xer, a former Officer in NZDF and TDBs Military Blogger – his work is on substack