On 17 March, Putin was re-elected, with an enormous majority that demonstrates either; his complete control of Russia’s democratic institutions or that the people of Russia strongly support the Ukraine War. The result is not unexpected and reinforces the long-term security threat that Russia poses because it indicates that Putin’s grip on Russia is tightening.
However, Ukraine’s soldiers are still holding the line and Russia is not making the progress it needs to in the land campaign. Instead, it appears that Russia’s energy is directed elsewhere; punishing Ukraine by attacking civilian electricity infra-structure, driving Free Russia Legion soldiers out of Belgorod and responding to the recent ISIS terror attack.
Meanwhile, European positions are hardening. The European Union, providing another large aid package to Ukraine and meeting this week to develop long-term plans to support Ukraine that should ring alarm bells in the Kremlin.
Why the Russian election is important
Russian election results are in and Vladimir Putin won an outstanding 87% of the vote. Most of the world considers the election a sham but behind the theatre, there is a story that needs to be unpacked.
Putin’s 87% is his largest majority, when he was first elected in 2000 his vote was 53%. Since then, he has worked studiously to tighten his grip on power and demonstrate to the Russian people that he is their anointed leader, successive elections returning larger majorities.
However, until this election Putin always tolerated a small amount of opposition. For example, in 2004 his winning majority was 71.9%, allowing a range of other candidates to at least poll and acknowledging that some differing political opinions could be integrated into the Russian state. In 2012, returning to power after Dmitry Medvedev’s term Putin’s majority was 63.6% of the vote. A majority that again showed that his regime could tolerate different voices. In 2018, Putin won with a 77.9% majority a shift towards reducing the diversity of opinion allowed in the election process.
Now, in 2024 almost all opposition has been eliminated providing an interesting insight into Putin’s thinking. He is obviously concerned about the war and is managing the election to demonstrate that that he has a mandate from the people. This is not the relaxed, confident politician re-elected in 2012 on 63.6% of the vote, secure enough to allow a 36% dissenting vote. This year’s election result indicates that Putin is worried and is not confident enough to tolerate opposition.
Additionally, it indicates that his plans are to continue the militarisation of the Russian state. Already, the economy is on a war footing and the prisons and non-ethnically Russian republics have been emptied as his regime looks for cannon fodder. But Ukraine is not defeated and now Putin needs to prepare the Russian heartland for a longer war, probably one involving mass mobilisation and conscription. A step that will not be popular so he will use this election result to provide a mandate for it. Putin’s use of this mandate to militarise Russia is sad and dangerous because it means he is planning for a long conflict, so Ukraine must prepare to endure more war. While Europe, the United States and the world should also be prepared for a long period of tension and competition.
Why the land campaign is so important, and an update on recent activity
The land campaign is the most important aspect of this war and success is defined by where the front line rests. A measure that may not be militarily accurate, but that is easy for mainstream media to use to explain the war’s progress to their readers. For instance, the battle of Avdiivka and Bakhmut are portrayed as Ukrainian losses in the media because the frontline moved a short distance west.
However, from a military perspective they are Pyrrhic victories at best. Russia suffered staggering losses of soldiers and equipment in both. More importantly neither battle provided an exploitable opportunity for Russia to push forward and break Ukrainian lines. A more complex and tactically sound interpretation of these battles is that they inflicted significant attrition on Russian forces and fixed Russia’s main effort on one point of the frontline, denying Russia operational initiative. The 50,000 soldiers required to take Avdiivka could have been a useful reserve for Russia to use to attack a less well-defended section of frontline.
Unfortunately, this complexity is hard to explain in the short articles and headlines that shape public opinion in the countries supporting Ukraine. Escalating the importance of where the frontline rests into the strategic realm. Essentially, a Ukrainian withdrawal of several kilometres even after inflicting tens of thousands of casualties on Russia is portrayed as a defeat, that has the potential to undermine resolve in the countries that support Ukraine.
Recently, we stated that the land campaign is at an ‘inflection point,’ one at which the curve will either bend dramatically in Russia’s favour or will arc incrementally towards Ukraine. (See ‘The war is reaching an important inflection point’ 11 March 2024). We assessed that the key decision point would be Russia’s ground offensive in the north-east because if Russia can break through Ukraine’s line and exploit the situation driving either west or south and ‘move the line’ significantly on the map it will dramatically increase Russia’s chances of ‘winning’ the war.
Two weeks later Russia has still not achieved an exploitable breakthrough, even though it is currently estimated to have a 7-1 advantage in artillery ammunition. Ukraine is generally holding the line and fi required giving ground very slowly.
Russia retains a large force in Luhansk and its main effort is currently directed at the area around Kremina, Lyman and Bakhmut. This activity is consistent with the assessment we made on 11 March, that Russia is likely to try and capture Lyman then close the salient between it and Bakhmut. An operation that if successful will bring its artillery within range of the cities of Sloviansk and Kramatorsk.
Russia’s slow progress means it has not been able to develop sufficient momentum to create an exploitable break through. An observation that does not bode well for Russia because if a break through cannot be achieved with a 7-1 advantage in artillery ammunition, better trained infantry, improved indirect-fire targeting tactics (See ‘A Chaotic Russian election week’ 18 March 2024) and full war-time mobilisation of the Russian economy then the chances of victory look slim.
On 22 March, Ukraine’s Deputy Defence Minister, Lieutenant General Ivan Havrylyuk said that he expects that with European Union assistance the disparity in the artillery ammunition supply will disappear in the next month or two. This statement provides a useful planning time frame for analysis because if Russia has not achieved a break through by this time it is unlikely to.
Therefore, in the next few weeks we should expect to see continued or increasing Russian pressure on this section of the frontline. Russia aiming to make progress before European aid arrives and to force Ukraine to use ammunition or equipment it receives immediately rather holding it back to build up useful reserves.
Russia responds to Ukraine’s election week drone campaign
Russian drones and missiles pummelled Ukraine’s power network and cities last week. On the night of 21-22 March, Russia launched its largest attack yet on the Ukrainian energy network. Ukrainian government sources reporting coordinated strikes by around 151 drones and missiles. The increase in activity is likely to be an angry response to Ukraine’s recent surge in attacks on Russian oil facilities. A campaign that is hurting the Russian economy, especially now that India has responded to recent United States sanctions by reducing oil imports from Russia.
Moscow terror attack
On 22 March, gunmen stormed the Crocus City Hall during a concert and killed at least 133 people. ISIS Khorasan (ISIS K), an ISIS group based in Afghanistan and neighbouring Central Asian republics quickly claimed responsibility for the attack.
The attack provides important insights into Russia’s security and intelligence services that are obviously stretched dealing with the Ukraine War. The White House has issued a statement saying that United States intelligence agencies warned their Russian counterparts of the possibility of an attack. Additionally, the United States issued a warning to Americans in Moscow that there was an increased risk of terror attacks so they should avoid large crowds.
That the attack happened, after receiving a warning, that was in turn corroborated by American actions is a significant Russian intelligence failure. A failure that indicates Russia’s security agencies, the FSB and the SVR are over-stretched, probably because they are focussed on the Ukrainian threat. A situation that could see more attacks by groups like ISIS K.
The attack was quickly ‘spun’ by the Kremlin as being associated with or supported by Ukraine. A highly unlikely hypotheses but one that provides Putin with an opportunity to leverage more domestic support for increased militarisation. The shock effect of the attack creating fear that can be leveraged using propaganda to justify steps like mobilisation using conscription.
Europe’s position hardens, more support coming
In European capitals there was a clear hardening of attitudes based on an acceptance that Russia is a long-term security threat, and that Ukraine’s war is absolutely Europe’s concern. Russia’s election result confirmed that Putin is ‘digging in’ for the long-term and increasing his militarisation of wider Russian society. A dangerous trend, one that is noted in Europe and is spurring action.
On 20 March, the European Union released another 4.5 billion euros to support the Ukraine government. This is not military aid but rather is cash to keep Ukraine’s government running. But the biggest European discussion this week was about using seized Russian assets to pay for the war effort. Russia has huge sums of money invested ‘off shore’ in Europe, early in the war this money was frozen. An important break with historical precedent. Generally, the international financial system ‘looks the other way’ during conflicts, the desire to ensure the integrity and stability of financial systems outweighing moral considerations.
The decision to freeze Russian ‘off shore’ assets caused Putin considerable concern. Originally, the European Union’s plan was to use the frozen assets to finance the reconstruction of Ukraine after the war. However, this week the idea of using the interest accruing in these funds to purchase military equipment and ammunition was discussed, a move the Kremlin describes as theft. The interest is worth billions and would provide a useful revenue stream to support Ukraine.
Summary
Russia’s position is getting worse, Putin may have been through the formalities of an election. An election that served its purpose, confirming him as leader and his mandate for war but does not change the military situation. His most pressing concern is that the European Union is mobilising, its members taking direct steps to support Ukraine and discussing economic mobilisation. Russia’s economy is tiny compared to the combined economic power of Europe. In a couple of month’s Ukraine’s ammunition deficit will start to disappear, and by 2025 Europe plans to be producing 2 million artillery shells per annum.
In conclusion, Putin is running out of time to secure a definitive victory before European support arrives. Currently, he does not have the resources to conquer Ukraine. Instead, he needs to make enough progress that Ukraine starts to look shaky, encouraging people in donor nations to argue that there is no point supporting Ukraine to win the war. If he can achieve this objective and European support falters, he can extend the war and overtime extend Russia’s control of Ukraine. If on the other hand, Ukraine’s supporters start pouring resource into Ukraine, Russia’s days are numbered.
Right now, Russia has the best opportunity since February 2022 to advance, but Putin’s soldiers are only making incremental progress. Every week they fail to get a break through, the more the curve arcs towards Ukraine.
Ben Morgan is a bored Gen Xer, a former Officer in NZDF and TDBs Military Blogger – his work is on substack
