The toppling of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria at the hands of a coalition of opposing militant groups in December 2024 was a watershed moment for the region and beyond. The quick campaign by the militant coalition led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) that ultimately put an end to the Russia- and Iran-backed Syrian regime was reminiscent of the quick takeover of Afghanistan by the Afghan Taliban in August 2021.
However, not only supporters and admirers of HTS and the Afghan Taliban noted this parallel between the two entities. The Islamic State and specifically, the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), unleashed an anti-HTS and anti-Afghan Taliban media campaign that has been ongoing since the end of November. ISKP propagandists from Afghanistan and Pakistan rhetorically exploited the Syrian developments by adapting them to the Afghan context, and ISKP supporters from Central Asia undermined the victory in the eyes of Central Asian militants involved in the Syrian war.
The combination resulted in a joint political narrative that reinforced pre-existing anti-HTS and anti-Afghan Taliban sentiments while at the same time, galvanizing ISKP supporters online by providing them with new material to fuel the conspiracy theories already in their echo chamber.
ISKP in Afghanistan and Pakistan React to Events in Syria
The policy statements of ISKP leadership are disseminated through the Pashto branch of Al-Azaim Media. They are subsequently adopted by other linguistic branches of Al-Azaim and supporting media outlets, spreading the statements in various forms. However, shortly before the HTS takeover of Damascus on December 8, 2024, there was a noticeable decline in the Pashto outputs of Al-Azaim, particularly on key regional developments that typically reflect the group’s policies.
During this period, Mubarizeen Media appeared to fill this gap. A newly emerging ideologue, Abu Muhammad Khorasani, began commenting on the latest political developments through a weekly podcast. In mid-December 2024, Khorasani delivered ISKP’s first detailed perspective on Syria in two episodes of Mubarizeen Media’s Arzawanah podcast, spanning 46 minutes. Subsequently, on January 5, 2025, the fifth issue of the monthly Urdu magazine Nida-e-Khurasan (Voice of Khorasan or VoK Urdu) and, on January 9, a 12-page Urdu declaration from Mubarizeen Media provided further elaborations.
ISKP’s response had three key aspects. The primary goal of these messages was to uphold the group’s narrative and prevent the demoralization of its supporters in the region following the capture of Damascus by militants under the leadership of Ahmed Hussein al-Sharaa, known by his nom de guerre Abu Mohammad al-Julani. ISKP emphasized that while the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime was undeniably a reason for celebration, Julani’s leadership in this event did not absolve him from being an enemy of the Islamic State.
ISKP viewed Julani’s opposition to Islamic State founder and so-called first caliph Abu Bakar al-Baghdadi in a 2013 leadership dispute in Syria – which resulted in the establishment of a rival militant group parallel to the Islamic State – as a betrayal. Julani was accused of being responsible for the deaths of Islamic State members and their families due to his conflicts with the group in Syria. The most “severe crime” attributed to Julani was the HTS killing of the Islamic State’s fourth leader, Abu al-Hussein al-Husseini al-Hashimi, in Idlib, as well as the arrest and interrogation of his family members in April 2023.
The objective of these statements was to defend, rather than interpret as a strategic error, the 2013 decision by Islamic State leadership to expel Julani from the organization. It was asserted that, following the capture of Damascus, the increasing engagements and affiliations between Julani and the United States, along with the broader international community, signified that Julani’s ascension to power represented not a triumph of Islamic extremism, but rather a manifestation of U.S. and Western proxy influence.
Second, ISKP core messages referred to the HTS takeover by drawing a parallel to the Afghan Taliban’s capture of Kabul in August 2021. They argued that, according to their perspective, the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Kabul and the fall of the former democratic Afghan government leading to the Taliban’s rise to power was part of a U.S. conspiracy. Similarly, they contended that the takeover of power from Assad by Julani in Damascus was also part of a plan by the United States and its allies, rather than the result of military superiority.
The elevation of Julani to power was framed as a strategic move driven by the U.S. and global powers’ fear of the Islamic State in Syria, aimed at maintaining influence over their supporters. It was argued that, despite concerted efforts, Assad had failed to eliminate the Islamic State. Consequently, much like the Taliban’s rise in Afghanistan, HTS – a jihadist adversary of the Islamic State in Syria – was granted authority to curb the group’s influence in the region. One notable rationale for characterizing Julani’s ascension as part of a U.S.-led conspiracy was the claim that employing the Taliban as a tool against the Islamic State in comparison to a democratic government in Afghanistan proved to be a cost-effective strategy. This, it was argued, prompted the U.S. and the international community to replicate a similar approach in Damascus, mirroring their efforts in Kabul.
Third, ISKP sought to undermine the morale of Taliban supporters by criticizing their celebration of HTS’s rise to power as an Islamist victory in Syria. ISKP accused HTS of collaborating with the U.S. and coalition forces by providing intelligence in Idlib, which, according to Khorasani, facilitated the targeted killings of al-Qaida leaders aligned with the Taliban in Syria. This narrative was strategically constructed to disillusion Taliban supporters and challenge their perception of HTS’s success.
ISKP Central Asia Reacts to Events in Syria
The Central Asian constituencies of ISKP were among the first to comment on the HTS-led offensive in late November. This is likely because Central Asian militants affiliated with the Islamic State were directly involved in the war in Syria, which was the natural destination for them to migrate in addition to Afghanistan. Furthermore, the presence of Islamic State Central Asian family members in Syrian prisons and the activities of HTS-aligned Central Asia militant groups contributed to keeping ISKP Central Asian militants’ attention on the region.
ISKP supporters from Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and other Central Asian countries started to discuss the HTS offensive as it was underway. Subsequently, after the collapse of the Syrian regime, they shifted their criticism on specific policies and statements adopted by the transition government, often drawing a parallel with the Afghan Taliban’s system.
The core message of ISKP members from Central Asia is to argue that HTS will not establish a “pure” Islamic government while juxtaposing it with the Islamic State’s territorial control in Syria and Iraq. They urge Central Asian militants not to trust Julani because he will not allow them to wage war in Central Asia, similar to the attitude of the Afghan Taliban with Central Asian militant groups stationed in Afghanistan.
During the initial stages of the offensive, ISKP Uzbek members ridiculed HTS-aligned Central Asian militant organizations, the so-called tactical groups. Among these, the primary targets of ISKP Uzbek supporters are the Tavhid va Jihod group and G’uroba Katibasi, jihadist factions that include militants from Central Asian countries. ISKP Uzbek ideologues frequently criticize their military commanders, drawing a parallel with militants and soldiers from the Caucasus who are fighting alongside Russian troops in Ukraine, hence terming both of them as “infidels.”
After the collapse of the Syrian regime, ISKP Uzbek ideologues periodically circulated articles and posters where they attacked Julani and the new government. One recurrent propaganda topic popularized by Uzbek ISKP members is that there is no difference between Assad’s regime and the new one. As prominent ISKP Uzbek propagandist Ahmad Muhammad posted on his channel: “The change of power (or regime) in Syria will be like the change of colors on these flags: instead of red, green will go up, and instead of green, red will go down. That’s the whole point.” This is the same narrative that ISKP has framed around the change in the regime in Afghanistan, claiming that there is no difference between the former Republic regime and the Emirate, and the transition of the Afghan Taliban from militant movement to government.
Hence, on the one hand, they criticize the HTS-led government for its reconciliatory approach toward all the segments of Syrian society, including different sects and ethnicities, and for failing to enforce Shariah. On the other hand, they argue that HTS is serving the interests of other countries, mostly Turkiye but also Israel and the U.S., by not waging war against neighboring countries. Since August 2021, ISKP daily replicates the same criticism against the Afghan Taliban, accusing them of protecting the Shia community in Afghanistan while having cordial relations with regional countries.
ISKP Tajik supporters have been specifically paying attention to the post-Assad regime’s collapse period in Syria, the policies adopted by the new government, and the parallel with the Afghan Taliban. ISKP Tajik propagandists have flooded social media platforms with content merging anti-HTS and anti-Taliban narratives. Propaganda often displays meetings between Afghan Taliban representatives and Turkish officials, and HTS members with Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan. This propaganda generates conspiracy theories that depict a unified front against the Islamic State between Russia, the U.S., and Israel and their regional proxies, which ISKP identifies as the Afghan Taliban, Central Asian governments, and HTS.
The ISKP Tajik branch devoted ample space to countering the narratives of Central Asian militants aligned with HTS. One of its primary targets is a Tajik militant and vlogger, Muhsin, who is perceived as a threat by ISKP Tajik propagandists due to his popularity online, especially among youngsters. ISKP Tajik channels frequently publish detailed answers to videos and posts made by Muhsin, often stating that contrary to what he posts on his pages, Julani does not intend to challenge the U.S. and Russian interests in the region while keeping good relations with the Shia population in Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq.
Worryingly, ISKP Tajik propagandists online also displayed a strong sectarian narrative targeting both Damascus and Kabul in connection with Iran and the Shia communities in the Middle East and Afghanistan. Frequently, the group draws a parallel between the Afghan Taliban allowing Shia religious practices and celebrations in Afghanistan and HTS protecting the different Shia sects in Syria. Additionally, ISKP Tajik members accuse HTS of extending protection to Christian communities as well, further alienating Julani from the jihadist path, according to ISKP propaganda.
Conclusion
The ISKP core media’s response to the HTS takeover of Damascus reflected significant concern regarding the development. The group’s statements were primarily designed to minimize the potential influence of the historic HTS victory on its supporters in the region. To achieve this objective, ISKP relied on a series of conspiracy-based allegations to discredit HTS and portray its takeover of Damascus in a manner similar to the August 2021 Kabul takeover by the Taliban, which ISKP characterizes as a political settlement rather than a military triumph.
For ISKP’s Central Asian members, the victory of HTS in Syria is a significant challenge. Nonetheless, it also bears a potential opportunity for the group. Militants witnessed that while the Islamic State model failed to deliver a lasting statehood experiment and to achieve the toppling of Central Asian governments, the Afghan Taliban and the HTS models were successful, also thanks to the presence of affiliated Central Asian jihadists.
However, ISKP Central Asian members now highlight a potential destabilization factor for Syria: Will Damascus allow militants from Central Asia to fight against Central Asian governments? While Kabul was able to temporarily avoid this issue due to the ongoing war in Syria that diverted the attention of Central Asian militants, now, both for Syria and Afghanistan, there is the possibility that Central Asian jihadists might become impatient to point their weapons toward Central Asia. And ISKP is set to offer the opportunity.
/cdn.vox-cdn.com/uploads/chorus_asset/file/25838949/005NAuPugy1hxqapsuog0j3332222npe__1_.jpg?w=120&resize=120,86&ssl=1 "Oppo’s next foldable is about as thin as USB-C allows")
