At the start of 2025, the most important battle being fought in the Ukraine War is the one to influence President Trump. On 21 January, the new president will be inaugurated and both sides are committed to shaping his opinion because their policy will shape the course of the war. The new administration determining whether Ukraine is drawn into a long, grinding war of attrition supported only by its European allies; or whether America provides enough support to defeat Putin’s aggression.
Russia is maintaining its ‘full court’ press, burning through casualties at an incredible rate trying to maintain forward progress on the battlefield. Aiming to demonstrate strength, and the will to win at any cost. Ukraine’s soldiers on the other hand, are fighting a defensive battle in Donetsk, inflicting casualties on Russia while simultaneously striking hard elsewhere aiming to demonstrate that Ukraine can defeat Russia.
In the air, both sides continue to batter each other’s war-fighting infra-structure. Ukraine maintaining its long-range drone and missile attacks on Russia’s oil production facilities, military command and logistics hubs, A massive wave of drone and missile strikes on 14 January, destroying oil facilities and a range of military targets across Russia.
Russia’s air campaign continues to target Ukraine’s civilian infra-structure with regular drone and missile strikes on cities and power infra-structure. An especially large attack was launched on Christmas Day with approximately 70 missiles and 100 drones crossing the border into Ukraine. It is clear that Russia is maintaining pressure on civilians in Ukraine, these attacks designed to make the population as cold and uncomfortable as possible. A noteworthy point is the use of Ukraine’s own long-range missile, the ‘Neptune.’ Ukraine’s increasing use of these missiles demonstrates that the nation has a long-range strike capability regardless of future US support.
The operational-level situation
Russia’s main effort continues to be Pokrovsk, their aim is to capture the city and dominate transport route through area, and create base from which to campaign for control of the remainder of Donbas. Pokrovsk is near a set of important road and rail connections, and sits on high ground that dominates a large area, so it is a useful stepping stone on the path to capturing the cities of Sloviansk and Kramatorsk.
The struggle for Pokrovsk, is the essence of this campaign with Russia committing forces in Donetsk to outflank and envelop the town. While Ukraine attacks Russia’s flank in Kursk, trying to make Russia move soldiers away from Pokrovsk and reduce Russia’s ability to take the town. But from Ukraine’s perspective the battle in Donetsk is not about land, it is about attrition. Ukraine defending key towns, using the advantages of defence to destroy Russian equipment and inflict casualties, but conserving its own forces by withdrawing them before they are destroyed. The attack in Kursk contributes to the plan by drawing Russian forces away from Donetsk, reducing Russia’s offensive effectiveness and increasing Ukraine’s local combat power.
Ukraine’s successful attack in Kursk on 5 January received lots of media coverage. At tactical-level the attack was successful, Ukrainian forces advancing and expanding the territory they hold near Sudzha. This town is Ukraine’s base for operations in Kursk, and at tactical-level the operation clearly contributes to holding the town.
However, media coverage inflated the significance of this attack. Initial reporting indicated a more serious attack. This operation is noteworthy though because it demonstrates; Ukraine’s ability to conduct offensive operations and its desire to hold ground in the Kursk region. But the attack is not operationally significant, being similar in size and progress to many Russian attack and did not influence the wider campaign.
Further south, Russia’s attack on Pokrovsk is developing as predicted. (See – Trump fires the first shots in possible negotiations, is the end-game starting? ) The Russians choose not to attack the city through the wide bowl of open ground immediately to its east, instead they manoeuvred far to the south using a wide left flanking approach. This axis of attack allows them to approach through broken ground (ridge lines, waterways and woodland) that provides cover for their movement.
The areas surrounding Pokrovsk are also contested. Russian forces continue to attack Kurakhove, Toretsk and Chasiv Yar but since the last article none of this activity has produced an operational-level change in situation.
What can we expect next at operational-level?
It is important to look beyond the ‘lines on the map’ when analysing a military campaign. At this stage, Russia is capturing ground but the operational-level campaign appears to be developing in-line with Ukrainian strategy. In February 2024, when General Oleksandr Syrskyi took command of Ukrainian forces, he was clear that Ukraine’s intent was inflicting attrition on Russian forces. He stated that Ukraine would switch to a defensive phase of operations, forcing Russia to attack and using the advantages of defence to maximise Russian casualties.
Even Ukraine’s attack in Kursk contributes to the overall objective of forcing Russia into costly offensive operations. Rather than being able to achieve overwhelming force in Donetsk, Russia has had to deploy soldiers to Kursk to contain, then attack the Ukrainian salient. This slows down their advance in Donetsk and creates opportunities to attrit Russian forces sent to repel the Ukrainian incursion.
Although Russia is capturing ground, all ground is not equal. And, in this war the small towns sitting on high ground are the key terrain. Urban areas with solidly constructed apartment blocks and factories that become strong points, dominating surrounding road and rail junctions. Places like Chasiv Yar, Toretsk and Pokrovsk. And Russia is losing enormous amounts of men and equipment with limited success taking these pieces of key terrain.
During the next few weeks, while the new administration settles into the Whitehouse, we should expect to see the campaign increase in intensity. The most important area is around Pokrovsk, where Russia is currently building towards an attack from the south. Therefore, expect a large attack on Pokrovsk probably in the next few weeks. The attack timed to influence US policy, a demonstration that the Russia has offensive capacity and can defeat Ukraine. Attacking from this direction their assault force can use broken ground to advance with a degree of concealment.
The attack on Pokrovsk is likely to follow the pattern we have seen in Avdiivka and Bakhmut, a long slow attack supported by artillery and airpower. As the attack on Pokrovsk develops we should also expect more pressure on Chasiv Yar, Toretsk and the areas around these towns as Russia seeks to control ground to envelop Kramatorsk and Sloviansk from the south.
Russia will also seek to maintain pressure north of Kramatorsk and Sloviansk, so expect more fighting along the Oskil River near Kupyansk and near Lyman. If Russia can advance on Kramatorsk and Sloviansk from both north and south it is easier to envelop the cities, cut supply lines and starve the defence.
A key aim of Russian operations in the next few weeks will be to influence the new president by presenting the war in Ukraine as a forgone conclusion, one that US aid cannot influence.
And, what about the new White House?
The key unanswerable question is what President Trump’s policy towards Ukraine will be, and at this stage there is little firm information about his position. Already Presidents Putin and Zelensky are bargaining. Putin appears to be trying to ‘play hardball,’ while Zelensky is a ‘building bridges’ by meeting with President Trump and toning down his rhetoric allowing for compromise positions.
At this stage we can speculate based on three factors likely to influence US policy:
President Trump’s key security appointments indicate that the new White House is likely to be focussed on competition with China. President Trump’s cabinet appointments include people like Marco Rubio and Mike Waltz, regarded as ‘hawkish’ towards China. In simple terms the US has bigger security issues than Russian aggression in Europe, and the Ukraine War is a distraction. A situation, General Sir Richard Barrons a retired UK Joint Force Commander summarised in 2022 when he described the conflict with Russia as “a speed bump on the way to the trilogy of the rise of China, climate change and the digital age.” A statement that several key people in the new administration may agree with, and that mitigates towards ending the Ukraine conflict as quickly as possible. Further, competition with China is difficult even for the US, and so it needs NATO’s military, tech and economic resources.
The US has plenty of other issues to manage. As well as potentially existential threats, the US must also contend with a wide range of concerns like Middle East security issues, Iranian hostility, North Korean aggression and the rise of the BRICs nations.
Russia’s military weakness has been exposed. Prior to the Ukraine War, Russia was regarded as a first-rate military power. However, Russia’s military has consistently under-performed, suffering enormous casualties and is now running out of equipment. Further, there is evidence that Russia’s economy cannot stand the strain of the war continuing.
Taking these factors into account, it seems likely that the new White House will want to disengage quickly. And, appeasing Russia probably does not contribute to this objective. Instead, this option has a range of poor outcomes. It empowers Russia, an ally of China and it undermines European confidence in the US at a time when the US probably needs NATO resources. Additionally, there is no guarantee that withdrawing US support will force Ukraine to stop fighting, potentially creating a long, slow European war. A situation no-one wants.
Further, Russia is weak both economically and militarily, which means that US aid to Ukraine, or increased sanctions on Russia are liable to have a powerful impact. Putin’s unreasonable behaviour and irresponsible nuclear rhetoric have also damaged his relationship with China. Essentially, Putin has a weak hand, and President Trump’s advisors know that putting pressure on him will be easier than on Ukraine.
President Trump has a great deal of political capital in negotiating a quick end to the war. Therefore, my assessment is that Putin will be given an ultimatum, and if he does not accept the conditions of it US aid will flow into Ukraine.
Summary
The next few weeks will be very interesting and important. We should expect the unexpected, for instance if either side has the capability for a large offensive operation it is likely to be in the next few weeks. Likewise, we should expect to see more and heavier air attacks and threatening rhetoric as both sides aim to influence the US.
However, I believe that Russia is on the back foot, this war has demonstrated their military weakness and if the US fully mobilises its economic and military support for Ukraine Putin’s days are numbered. The question though, is whether Putin understands his weakness, and is willing to negotiate?
Ben Morgan is a bored Gen Xer, a former Officer in NZDF and TDBs Military Blogger – his work is on substack
