Entering the third year of war in Ukraine, we can pause for reflection and look at lessons from the conflict. Lessons that can inform defence discussions around the world and help us to understand what future conflict may look like.
What has changed since February 2023?
On the ground, not a lot. Ukraine’s 2023 offensive was unable to break strong Russian defences and culminated with very limited gains. In October, Russia started offensive operations as Ukraine’s progress slowed down, and recently captured Avdiivka, a small town in Donetsk. Aside from Avdiivka, Russia’s offensive has taken little ground, demonstrating two points. First, the advantage of fighting from defence and second that Ukraine did not over extend itself during its 2023 offensive, retaining sufficient combat power that Russia has not been able to transition from defence to large scale offensive manoeuvre.
Ukraine’s success at sea
At sea, Ukraine’s drones, aircraft and missiles have taken a significant toll on the Black Sea Fleet. The campaign’s focus appears to be not only pushing Russia’s ships out of the Black Sea but also weakening Crimea’s air defence network.
Around 10-11 September last year Ukraine re-captured the Boyko Towers, oil and gas platforms in the Black Sea that provide surveillance positions covering the eastern half of the sea. Immediately, Ukraine’s pace of operations in the area increased, nine Russian warships damaged or sunk since September 2023, five between12-13 September. Further, Ukraine’s air campaign against Crimean land targets intensified including destroying the Black Sea Fleet’s headquarters.
This strategy has driven Russia out of the western half of the Black Sea, allowing for maritime trade via Odessa. It also impacts Russian logistics, with ships carrying ammunition being targeted. Control of the sea also allows brief commando raids on Crimea. Raids that appear to target air defence radar stations and command hubs.
The air war, lots for Russia to think about
Russia does not have complete air superiority and Ukraine is using long-range drones to attack targets deep inside Russia. Russian air defence in Crimea and Kherson appears to be successfully degraded with Ukrainian drone attacks targeting Russia’s network of early warning assets including ground-based radars and command centres. ‘Patriot traps’ or sniping important airborne early warning and command aircraft with Patriot missiles brought close to the frontline, is a new tactic proving very effective.
Evidence that this campaign is degrading Russian air defences in Crimea and Kherson is provided by the continuing presence of Ukrainian forces on the east bank of the Dnipro River. This bridgehead has not been bombed out of existence by Russian aviation, an indication of Ukraine’s ability to create at least small protected areas for ground operations. Another indicator is the increasing number of successful drone and missile attacks on Russian facilities and ships in this area. Degrading Russian air defences in this area could indicate that Ukraine is preparing for some sort of significant activity, possibly when their F16s start coming into service later this year.
Meanwhile, long-range Ukrainian drones are battering Russia’s oil and gas infra-structure. In a clear effort to damage Russia’s economic base, drones relentlessly attack oil refineries, depots and port facilities. This campaign highlights the difficulty Russia has protecting itself against long-range drones.
US support becomes unpredictable
Ukraine is unlikely to lose the war suddenly at this point, it shows no sign of capitulating, is mobilising its large defence industry and still has European Union support. However, American support cannot be guaranteed presenting a worst-case scenario in which the war becomes a longer, lower intensity war of attrition. Neither side able to develop sufficient combat power to win, but both unwilling to negotiate.
The single factor most likely to prevent this scenario developing is US support. The US can provide sufficient material that Ukraine could drive Russian forces out of the country. US policy to-date however has evolved slowly based on concerns about Russia’s military power and willingness to use nuclear weapons. The war has demonstrated that the first concern is unwarranted, Russia’s equipment is out of date and poorly utilised. A conventional war with NATO would result in a catastrophic defeat for Russia.
The threat of Russian nuclear escalation needs to be managed, Putin’s threats early in the war had weight because they were backed by known capability and unknown intent. Now it is clear that Putin is very unlikely to use nuclear weapons, NATO’s resolve and the reactions of his supporters disincentivising their use.
Currently, Ukraine is suffering from that caution as changes in US domestic politics create debate about US aid. It is terrible situation that undermines global stability. If American leaders sacrifice a military partner (Ukraine) to score points in domestic politics the message sent to other aggressive regimes is that; US defence commitments are fickle. This incentivises other nations to challenge the international rules-based order that is under-pinned by US military alliances.
Mobilisation of the Russian ‘defence industrial base’
In 2023, Russia fully mobilised its ‘defence industrial base’ putting its whole economy on a war footing. It is estimated that 40% of its GDP is now committed to the war. Europe’s failure to meet promised commitments of ammunition and shaky American support means that Russia currently has a significant material advantage over Ukraine. Russia’s current offensive is probably timed to take advantage of this situation because it is unlikely to be permanent.
Ukraine is mobilising its own economy and when it was part of the Soviet Union Ukraine was an important manufacturing area producing weapons, ammunition, tanks, artillery, helicopters and aircraft. Several European nations are also starting to mobilise their defence industries to support Ukraine because they understand the Russian threat.
Economically, Russia is at its peak and production likely to reduce over time. The peak is sustained by oil and gas revenue and a large war-chest. Ukraine’s drone campaign against Russian oil and gas infrastructure targets this revenue stream and is probably going to be more effective than the current set of sanctions. Evidence to date, is that Russia’s defence industry is focussed on re-furbishing mothballed equipment rather than producing new equipment and sanctions may prevent large-scale production of new tanks, planes, radios, radars and other equipment requiring electronic components that cannot be salvaged from civilian goods. This suggests that Russia’s defence industry may not be able to produce large amounts of new equipment without considerable investment.
Long-term if Ukraine can stay in the fight supported by at least the European Union it will reduce Russia’s material advantages. Sanctions and loss of oil and gas revenue will degrade Russia’s defence industry while Ukraine’s grows.
Four key lessons from 2023
Around the world, people interested in defence policy and the military should be studying Ukraine and learning from this war and below I have provided my top four lessons from 2023.
Industrial war is back
Early in the war, Professor Michael Clarke a retired Director of the Royal United Services Institute opined that the Ukraine War represented the return of ‘industrial war’ to Europe. The term being used to describe large-scale attritional war between nation-states in which both sides enlist their whole economies into the competition. A form of war that has not been seen in Europe since 1945.
Unfortunately, as we enter the third year of this war Professor Clarke appears to be correct. The war’s outcome becoming an increasingly attritional question of which side’s industrial base can generate more ammunition and equipment. A sad lesson from Ukraine is that all nations need to be prepared for longer wars by developing economic plans and alliances that can sustain force levels through long-term conflicts.
Operational learning versus tactical innovation
This war is interesting to study because it throws into stark relief the differences between modern Western doctrine that emphasises ‘tactical innovation’ and Soviet/Russian doctrine that focuses on ‘operational learning.’ Essentially, the difference is that for all of its tactical level rigidity a Russian force’s centralised control enables it to assess innovations; and if they ‘add value,’ quickly disseminate them through the whole force. Russian forces can operationalise innovation across their force, in slow but very structured manner that has produced incremental improvement in their capability over the last year.
Ukraine’s military culture is more influenced by modern Western doctrine, that after 30 years of peace-keeping and small operations focuses on encouraging tactical innovation. The result is that Russia’s force in Ukraine is slowly and incrementally evolving because at the operational level of command (i.e. across the whole land campaign) orders can be made that immediately introduce new tactics or ways of operating. Innovation in Russian forces may be slower but is more impactful, Russian ‘storm tactics’ provide an example of how this process works.
Storm tactics involve using squads of prisoners to conduct initial reconnaissance of enemy positions. Expendable soldiers are pushed forwards in ‘meat waves’ that provide information about enemy positions that allow later waves to target key weapons systems like machine guns or automatic grenade launchers. This tactic started with Wagner Group in Bakhmut and the doctrine has solidified and been disseminated across the Russian army in Ukraine.
Ukraine’s forces on the other hand innovate tactically all over the campaign but appear less good at sharing these lessons. The recent appointments of young commanders with a history of innovative tactics to senior command positions may be a way to address this issue.
Western militaries need to learn from the Ukraine War because after decades of being focussed at the tactical level, this war is a reminder that the operational level of war requires a different set of skills. Across the Western world armies have shrunk and conventional combat arms like artillery and armour reduced. In recent years, special forces (SF) officers, masters of tactical operations rose to new levels of command prominence within Western armies. A natural trend because without the Soviet threat and with increased détente with China the prospect of conventional war reduced. Fighting asymmetric forces like Al Qaeda, the Taliban or militias required tactical level skills so these specialists rose in the rank. Likewise, after World War Two artillery and armoured corps officers tended to rise to senior command positions because that era of conflict emphasised their skill sets. Ukraine demonstrates that the way we need to fight in the future is changing and Western armies need to re-learn the skills of large-scale operations.
The proliferation of drones and low-cost precision strike
Retired Australian General Mick Ryan, pointed out recently that a key issue with modern drones is the disparity between the cost of a drone and the missile that intercepts it. Currently, modern militaries deploy incredibly effective but complex air defence missiles that are enormously expensive. In Ukraine, weapons like Patriot, Hawk, Mistral are stunningly effective, however using a missile that costs hundreds of thousands, or millions of dollars to shoot down a drone worth a couple of thousand dollar is hugely wasteful and unsustainable.
The proliferation of drones and low-cost precision strike that we are witnessing in Ukraine, Gaza and the Red Sea needs to be sounding alarm bells in modern armies. The lesson is that more effective low-cost solutions need to be developed, quickly. In a recent Pacific Brief, we noted that US Navy ships in the Red Sea are reported to be using 5’’ gunfire to engage Houthi drones. A smart use of a weapon that many felt was out-of-date, a 5’’ shell costs only a few hundred dollars and ship can carry hundreds of them.
Electronic jamming is also proving highly effective in Ukraine, for example American Switchblade loitering drones appear to have been effectively countered by Russian jamming and a feature of the fighting along the Dnipro River is Ukraine’s early capture of mid-stream islands that were used for jamming sites.
Modern battlefields require lots of infantry
A lesson from Ukraine is that any force needs plenty of infantry soldiers. Foot soldiers that get out of their vehicles and walk through towns, cities, forests, mountains and swamps to find the enemy and kill or capture them. Infantry are also the soldiers that secure ground, protecting it from the enemy.
Most modern armies have reduced in size and their infantry numbers have decreased. Even Russia started the war with far fewer infantry than it needed. The Ukraine War demonstrates the requirement for lots of infantry, and for sustainability. In peace-time generals ‘make do,’ accepting funding cuts and telling their political masters that new technology means an army can ‘do more with less.’ Ukraine proves that this is not true and that new tech means many, many more threats dispersed over more and more complex terrain that need to be hunted out.
The campaign against the Houthi is a good example. Today, insurgents like the Houthi have easy access to long-range drones and missiles allowing them to project power long distances. For example, the Houthi fired missiles at Haifa, 1800km from their bases and these weapon systems are easy to disperse and hide. Aerial bombing or missiles attacks simply force an enemy to disperse and reappear elsewhere. The range of modern precision-strike weapons means that dispersal is unlikely to limit their power projection. Factors that mean the bombing campaign against the Houthi is unlikely to be successful. A point proven throughout history as air campaigns have proven ineffective at stopping either; the economies of large powers or at crippling insurgencies. The only way to permanently counter a threat like this is to put ‘boots on the ground’ to kill or capture personnel and secure the areas that these weapons are operated from.
Looking to future conflicts in the Pacific, with its very complex terrain there will be a requirement for lots of infantry soldiers. Unfortunately, in recent decades none of the Pacific’s major powers has focussed on force sustainability. Once large reserve forces (part-time soldiers) that provided for rapid expansion of an army have shrunk and limited defence budgets have been directed towards peace-keeping or fighting smaller insurgent forces. The ratio of frontline infantry soldiers to support soldiers in most modern-Western armies varies between 1-5 and 1-7. For instance, this means that the Australian Army with a published ‘strength’ of approximately 28,000 can deploy roughly around 5000 actual frontline infantry soldiers. A relatively small force when the amount of infantry required for the battle over the small town of Avdiivka is considered. The lesson is that if countries want to maintain the military capacity for effective deterrence, then they are going to need the ability to generate large numbers of infantry soldiers. Reserve forces are a cost-effective and proven method to achieve this goal.
What can we expect in 2024?
Analysis of what we can expect to see in the next twelve months requires consideration of a range of different factors with limited information. In the section below I have summarised my assessment of the situation.
The key question is whether the US will continue to support Ukraine
The current Congressional debate about the White House’s aid package is the key external factor influencing how the war will evolve in 2024. If the US Congress does not authorise the proposed aid package the impact on Ukraine will be significant. The potential impact is well articulated by RAND’s Rapheal S Cohen, who summed up the situation as follows; “Simply put, Ukraine could lose the war. Russia could win, a bloody but ultimately successful campaign. American adversaries around the world would be emboldened. And the United States would have—yet another—massive unforced strategic blunder in a geopolitical environment that increasingly has little margin for error.”
In my opinion, the potentially catastrophic implications for US foreign policy of not supporting the aid package, mitigate towards Congressmen and women seeing sense and eventually voting for the package.
But it is not certain, and future US aid is also impacted by the Presidential election later this year that may return Trump, whose position regarding international commitments and US foreign policy is highly unpredictable. The uncertainty of US support leads to two broad scenarios for what may happen in Ukraine this year.
A high-impact scenario. The US aid package is thwarted in Congress, or is reduced to ineffectiveness by Congressional ‘horse trading.’ The President continues to use ‘excess defence articles authority’ to ‘ring trade’ surplus US military equipment to other countries in exchange for them sending their older equipment to Ukraine.
Ukraine will continue to fight but at a much lower level of military capability and European support will have to shift from predominantly financial to supplying more weapons and equipment. In this scenario, the war settles into a long and uncertain battle of attrition.
A low-impact scenario. Congress approves the aid package and Ukraine receives approximately US$ 60 billion of aid providing the military equipment needed to guarantee another large-scale offensive in the next 12-18 months. A significant element within the aid package helps the Ukraine and US defence industries mobilise allowing a rapid escalation in ammunition production able to match or surpass Russian production.
Ukrainian operations can therefore be more aggressive based on greater certainty about their sources of supply. This means Russia’s economy is put under much greater pressure forcing its collapse sooner, facilitating a shorter battle of attrition. This scenario probably culminates in Ukraine returning to large offensive operations on land in 2025, facing a significantly weakened Russian army.
Ukraine’s options
Ukraine’s military planners are in a very difficult position trying to develop strategy without good information about their force’s sustainability and resources. Good generals understand a concept the military calls ‘tempo,’ or that battles and campaigns have a natural ebb and flow. For instance, Ukraine attacked last year and there was intense defensive fighting. Then as Ukraine’s offensive culminated there was a short period of lower activity as Russia transitioned from defence to offensive activity. Currently, we are watching another period of intense activity as Russia attacks and Ukraine defended.
Tempo is constant, and Russia’s current offensive will culminate soon, providing a potential ‘window’ for aggressive Ukrainian action. However, any aggressive action involves risk. So, the question this year is, will Ukraine accept that risk? Especially, when US support is uncertain.
Ukraine’s most likely course of action – Sit tight, defend and attrit Russia
This is Ukraine’s publicly stated course of action and the one that most commentators are picking. It involves Ukraine continuing its successful air and sea offensives. Ukraine would continue to target the Russian oil and gas industry to reduce Russia’s economic power. Additionally, Ukraine would target the Black Sea Fleet and continue to degrade Crimea’s air defences. The strategic aim is attrition or reducing Russia’s national war-fighting capability.
On land, at an operational level Ukraine settles into an active defence. The aim of which is to attrit Russia’s ground forces, secure the current front-line and provide the security required for Ukraine to build new reserves ready for offensive action in 2025.
Ukraine’s most dangerous course of action – Aggressive action
Like the previous course of action, this one involves Ukraine continuing its successful air and sea offensives. The strategic aim is still to attrit or reduce Russia’s national war-fighting capability. However, the battle for international support is fought in the information domain. In my opinion, if Ukraine had reached the Sea of Azov, cut the land bridge to Crimea and presented its supporters with a victory in 2023 the US would not be debating Ukraine aid packages. Instead, the prospect of ‘backing a winner’ and inflicting a defeat on Russia would have encouraged Americans to support Ukraine’s war effort.
The changes to Ukraine’s military leadership over the winter are significant and bring together a senior leadership team with considerable experience, and a history of innovation. Ukraine’s appreciation of the situation may be that now is the time for risk. Last year’s offensive was characterised by taking lower risk options. For instance, Ukraine sacrificed the surprise and initiative it held after the successful Kharkiv and Kherson offensives to ensure new equipment was in service and its soldiers well-trained before starting its 2023 offensive. This period in late-2022 and early 2023 was used by Russia to re-organise and strengthen defensive lines ready for Ukraine’s attack.
It is possible that a Ukrainian lesson from last year’s offensive is that to sit and wait allows Russia to develop better defences. Instead, it may be better to take a risk and demonstrate to international supporters that Ukraine is still able to achieve success. Ukraine retains a foothold on the east bank of the Dnipro River and is actively attacking air defences in Crimea and Kherson. Perhaps a successful operation in this area coinciding with the Russian elections could have a significant impact on international opinion. A high-risk option so very unlikely, but one that could have a large strategic pay-off.
Summary
The last year of the war has produced several useful lessons for military policy-makers and for people interested in defence discussions. Some of these lessons challenge deeply held military orthodoxies that will be uncomfortable. However, it is important that we consider them and discuss them, especially in areas like the Pacific that are currently facing a range of security challenges during a period of major power competition. A situation that will be impacted by the trends we see in Ukraine.
Finally, 2024 will be a defining year for this campaign and for global stability. If America fails Ukraine, that war will be much longer and the outcome becomes less certain but the impact will be felt across the globe. US steadfastness underwrites defence alliances and partnerships around the world that secure international stability, if US domestic politics undermines that confidence, we are likely to see many more security challenges.
Ben Morgan is a bored Gen Xer, a former Officer in NZDF and TDBs Military Blogger – his work is on substack
