BEN MORGAN: Ukraine’s tactical-level plan for Kursk, more bad news for Russia

Ukraine’s tactical plan in Kursk is becoming clearer, and it is not good news for Russia.  Ukraine continues to incrementally advance the frontline of the salient, in all directions. Ukraine claims to have captured 93 settlements and about 1,200 square kilometres of Russian territory.  Ukrainian leaders, President Zelenskyy and General Syrskyi are both discussing the idea of developing a ‘buffer zone’ in Kursk to prevent attacks on Sumy.  Both statements indicating Ukraine’s leaders want to present their Russian counterparts with the threat of a long-term occupation of parts of Kursk. A politically embarrassing situation for Putin’s regime.

A strategy reinforced by Ukraine destroying three large bridges crossing the Syem River, at Karyzh, Zvanaoye and Glushkovo.  The immediate ‘effects’ of destroying these bridges are that:

Any Russian forces south of the Syem River are now isolated and are at risk of being trapped.
A Ukrainian advance, either west from the existing pocket, or east near Tyotinko, now has a protected northern flank.
If Ukraine wants to hold Russian territory, the Syem River can be turned into a formidable defensive barrier.

Tactically, this means trouble for Russia because Ukraine now has the potential to inflict a defeat as any Russian soldiers trapped between the river, and Ukrainian forces are easily captured or killed. Russia is furiously building pontoon bridges, trying to get supplies in, or soldiers out. Russia is burning up resources while effective Ukrainian long-range missile fire destroys both the bridges and the units building them.  The map below, shows Russia’s precarious position. Any Russian forces in the cross hatched area are now in danger, unable to be easily re-supplied or withdrawn.

Ukraine has created a potential kesselschlacht, or ‘cauldron battle’ by surrounding a group of Russian troops that can be slowly reduced.  Russian soldiers trapped in the pocket will suffer air, drone and artillery bombardment until they either surrender or are weakened enough to be easily attacked by Ukrainian manoeuvre units.

Operational-level success? 

Tactically, Ukraine’s use of aggressive manoeuvre, combined with ground to trap Russian forces has been successful, and it creates the potential for a significant victory.  Additionally, it also threatens that Ukraine will hold ground, creating a long-term political embarrassment and forcing Russia to commit a large force to their removal.  However, at this point Ukraine still faces the immediate problem of Russia’s advance on Pokrovsk.

It is important to monitor Pokrovsk when we discuss the success of Ukraine’s attack Kursk at operational-level because at this level success is based upon the following test  Does the attack effect Russia’s ability to achieve its goals in Donetsk?

Currently in Donetsk, Russia has not advanced past Ukraine’s defensive line, demarcated by Hrodivka, Novohrodivka, and Selydove. And in the last 48 hours is extending the base of its advance south, rather than west towards Pokrovsk, probably trying to turn the Ukrainian flank. Additionally, the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) reported on 20 August that Russia is working hard, trying to find soldiers across its whole frontline that can be moved to Kursk, and there are indications that the need for resources is great enough that some may be coming from important areas like the battle for Chasiv Yar.

At this stage, there is little evidence of Russian reserves being diverted from Donetsk to Kursk.  I agree with ISW’s assessment that: “…the Russian military command is likely extremely averse to pulling Russian military units engaged in combat from higher priority sectors in Donetsk Oblast due to concerns about further slowing the tempo of Russian operations in these directions.” However, Ukraine’s operation is clearly developing into something more significant than a raid or a brief occupation to damage infrastructure.

Instead, it is becoming a large and potentially long-term lodgement that will require lots of Russian combat power to remove. Russia’s dilemma is that the longer Ukraine’s troops are in location, the harder this task will become. So, Russian commanders must now decide whether it is better to concentrate on Pokrovsk, or to redeploy experienced soldiers from Donetsk and attack the Kursk salient before Ukrainian forces can ‘dig in.’

Summary

The pressure on Russia is increasing and even by threatening to capture and hold the area south of the Syem River Ukraine embarrasses Putin’s regime.  So far, Russia’s response has been piecemeal and uncoordinated and my assessment is that Russia is trading ground for time, neglecting this battle to concentrate on the main effort, Pokrovsk.

However, as Ukraine increases the pressure by demonstrating both an intent to occupy and more importantly, the capability to do so, Russia is being forced to re-consider.  Putin would need to be supremely politically secure to allow Ukraine to build a fortified camp in Kursk.  And if large numbers of quality soldiers are not directed to the region soon, that is what Putin faces, making this battle an important inflection point.

From a military perspective, Russia would be best to stay focussed on the main effort and keep its resources at Pokrovsk because winning there opens a credible path to capturing Donetsk. Ukraine’s operation in Kursk is not an immediate threat, it can be contained and could then be defeated on Russia’s terms. Ukraine probably does not have sufficient manpower or logistics to advance far enough to threaten militarily significant targets. However, wars are always fought for political reasons and it will be interesting to see if the political embarrassment outweighs military logic and drives the redeployment of resources from Donetsk to Kursk.