Bucking a trend, Russia launched an unusually large armoured attack this week and is currently on the offensive in Donetsk. The armoured attack was defeated by Ukraine but this week’s activity may indicate a change in Russia’s plans. Meanwhile, in the air drone and missile strikes continue to cross the border, destroying a range of military and civilian targets.
Strategically, both sides are carefully watching the US elections looking for opportunities. The withdrawal of President Joe Biden from the presidential race creating an uncertain period as the world waits to see who will win; and whether the US withdraws into isolationism. Ukraine opened a new line of diplomatic attack, visiting China and seeking that nation’s support to mediate peace with Russia.
Ukraine’s Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba visited Beijing on 23-24 July and participated in “very deep and concentrated” discussion with Chinese Foreign Minister, Wang Yi. This visit opens a range of potential possibilities for China to establish itself as an international leader and peacemaker.
General Syrskyi speaks
This week, General Oleksandr Syrskyi, Ukraine’s commander in Chief was interviewed by the Guardian. The interview was published on 24 July and provided interesting insight into the land campaign. The general said Ukraine believes Russia currently has approximately 520,000 personnel in Ukraine and that this number is likely to increase to roughly 690,000 by the end of the year.
This increase in capability is not a sudden event and Ukraine is also mobilising and receiving foreign aid. The general’s point being that even with these measures Russia continues to maintain a numerical advantage, and will continue to in the foreseeable future. Syrskyi discussed Russia’s training and tactical improvements over the course of the war and noted that Russian forces currently have a two-to-one or three-or-three to one advantage in a major equipment like tanks, armoured vehicles and artillery.
Essentially, there is mutual escalation and both sides land forces have expanded significantly since 2022, but Russia maintains its numeric advantage. However, this advantage is currently retained by using Soviet-era equipment, brought out of war stocks, refurbished and sent to the front. A logistics strategy that means Russia’s already mobilised defence industry has not yet been tested by having to produce large amounts of new equipment.
An important consideration for Ukraine’s strategy, that forces attrition on Russia because if Russia can produce large quantities of new tanks, armoured vehicles and guns the strategy could fail. Some analysts assess that Russia cannot produce enough new material to cover its losses when its war stocks run out. Euromaidan Press stating this position in June ( https://euromaidanpress.com/2024/06/22/resources-of-war-can-russia-sustain-its-war-in-ukraine-for-years-infographics/ ). Likewise, in February 2024 the International Institute for Strategic Studies assessed that Russia can maintain its current loss rate for approximately 2-3 years using re-furbished tanks ( https://www.iiss.org/en/online-analysis/military-balance/2024/02/equipment-losses-in-russias-war-on-ukraine-mount/ ) but in June 2024 reported the low production rate of Russia’s current generation T-90 tanks ( https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/military-balance/2024/06/russian-t-90m-production-less-than-meets-the-eye/ ).
On 24 July the Institute for the Study War summed this situation up as follows “The Russian government will likely have to further mobilize the Russian economy and defense industry if the Russian military intends to sustain its current tempo of operations in the medium- to long-term as Russia depletes its finite Soviet stockpiles, but it is unclear if the Russian defense industry will be able to produce enough vehicles to sustain a high level of equipment losses even with further economic mobilization.” Essentially, Russia looks set to maintain its material advantage for the foreseeable future but the capacity of its defence industrial base will be tested by a longer war.
Syrskyi also noted the difference in tactics between the two nations. Russia willing to sacrifice soldiers and equipment for limited gain. Recent figures for land captured by Russia since the start of the year; range from approximately 500kmsq on General Mick Ryan’s Substack, to approximately 600kmsq estimated by Al Jazeera through to approximately 900kmsq claimed by Russian Defence Minister Andrei Belousov. In lay terms, Russia has lost approximately 110,000 casualties (killed or seriously wounded) since the start of this year in exchange for capturing a land area about the size of New York city’s five boroughs. And, within this area there is little ground of tactical significance.
In the interview, Syrskyi discussed Ukraine’s long-range drone and missile campaign but was short on details about how the land campaign will develop. My assessment of his position is that the ‘Syrskyi Strategy’ is working, that by defending and giving ground slowly Ukraine is inflicting attrition on Russia. While it is defending, Ukraine can build its strength and attack Russian oil infra-structure and resources like the air defences that protect Russia’s vital ground, Crimea. Wearing down Russia’s economic ability to maintain the war and making Crimea less tenable. Syrskyi’s careful statement probably indicates that Ukraine is being cautious about discussing its plans or committing to larger operations until the US election is over, and there is certainty about US support.
The land campaign, a surprisingly busy week
This week the land campaign was punctuated by some noteworthy activity. Russia continues to attack along the length of the frontline, but with limited success. The Kharkiv Offensive appears to have culminated and Ukrainian forces are gaining ground in Vovchansk. Further east, fighting continues on the Kreminna-Svatove Line without significant gain and Chasiv Yar is still held by Ukraine.
Further south, there is a change in Russian activity. In recent weeks, Russia has been attacking vigorously south of Chasiv Yar near Toretsk. Including advancing on the town of Niu York for the last couple of weeks. Current fighting in the Toretsk Salient appears to be positional, neither side having a clear advantage.
Probably because they are making little progress at Chasiv Yar the Russians are trying to advance further south to interdict the H20/T0508/T0515 road network. This network of highways is used by Ukraine to supply Chasiv Yar, Kostyantynivka, Sloviansk and Kramatorsk. Chasiv Yar is tactically important because it sits on high ground, from which Kostyantynivka can be attacked and if this town is taken the road network can be interdicted. This relationship makes the two towns a key Russian objective, required for any future attack on Sloviansk and Kramatorsk. The last remaining large Donetsk cities in Ukrainian hands. Russia has not succeeded taking Chasiv Yar by direct assault so now appears to be swinging south and trying to cut the area’s supply line.
On 24 July, Russia mounted a large, approximately battalion-sized attack on Kurakhove. The attack included a tank company (11 tanks) supporting about 200 infantry soldiers mounted in 45 armoured vehicles. The Russian force included a rare ‘Terminator’ heavily armed and armoured infantry fighting vehicle. The attack was repulsed by Ukrainian forces using artillery and drones.
This attack is noteworthy because the last large armoured assault in Ukraine, was three months ago. Like other recent operations the target of the attack appears to be the road networks supplying Ukrainian strong points in this case; Chasiv Yar and Kostyantynivka to the north, and Vuledhar to the south. Kurakhove is about 15km from Russian held Marinka, so is within artillery range and the N15 Highway provides an ‘axis’ for an armoured assault.
An attack here supports Russian forces further north at Orcheretyne and if successful could contribute to a double envelopment. Russian forces at Orcheretyne advancing from the north and from Kurakhove in the south aiming to link up, capture ground and bring the T0515 Highway into artillery range. A firm base at Kurakhove could also be used to advance south, threatening Vuledhar with an attack from the north. If Russia can successfully achieve an offensive of the nature described, it would be an operationally significant operation. A success that would have strategic implications, sending a message to Ukraine and its supporters that Russia is still capable of operational level manoeuvre.
The large armoured attack may indicate many different things about Russia’s capabilities and plans. My assessment is that we should analyse this operation in the context of the recent fighting in Orcheretyne, Niu York and Toretsk. This activity probably indicates a drift south from Chasiv Yar, because that town is proving difficult to take. Therefore, Russia is looking for an indirect approach and seeking to attack the area’s supply lines. The big question is whether the drift south is a longer-term change in focus and whether Russia has the resources to exploit a breakthrough in this area. The large amount of rail infrastructure (shown on the map as black and white lines) behind Russia’s current area of focus suggests that Russia does have plans for a large attack and subsequent exploitation. Operations that rail infrastructure would be required to support.
On the banks of the Dnipro River the fight to maintain a Ukrainian foothold appears to be lost. The Ukrainian Ministry of Defence announcing this week that its forces have withdrawn from Krynky on the east bank.
Ukraine’s air war continues
In previous articles we have discussed Ukraine’s campaign to degrade Russia’s air power and this week several notable Ukrainian attacks took place. In an amazing display of their capability Ukrainian drones successfully damaged Russian aircraft at Olenya air base near Murmansk, on the shores of the Arctic Ocean about 1,800km from Ukraine.
Additionally, Saki air base in Crimea was attacked again on 26 July and on 22 July Ukrainian drones hit an air base at Morozovsk, in Rostov Oblast near Crimea. The attacks are reported to be targeting anti-aircraft missile launchers, radar systems and aircraft. Wikipedia counts 18 Russian aircraft lost to-date in 2024, 11 of which were combat aircraft and two of which are Airborne Early Warning and Command aircraft. Figures that bear comparison with a total of 24 lost in the whole of 2023.
Russia’s withdrawal from the skies after heavy combat aircraft losses in 2022 means that Ukraine’s plan to destroy Russian air power requires the use of long-range drones and missiles to target aircraft at their bases. Ukraine’s ability to hit aircraft at bases deep within Russia demonstrates how air defences have been reduced across the nation to ensure they are available for use in Ukraine.
Summary
Last week, I opined that Russia’s offensive is culminating. A position I still hold but that is challenged by recent Russian activity. Specifically, the large armoured assault on Kurakhove and the increasing activity in that general area. This activity should be noted and watched carefully because it may indicate that Russia has found a Ukrainian weakness, or that its forces are stronger than expected.
General Syrskyi’s interview this week with the Guardian, provided insight into the campaign. The general’s statements were cautious and did not provide definite insight about plans. However, General Syrskyi’s strategy appears to be working. Russia has thrown enormous resources at the land campaign with few tangible results and has suffered large casualties. Exactly, what the general said his plan wanted to achieve. The interview provided no useful information about proposed plans other than that Ukraine’s plan to isolate Crimea and destroy Russia’s airpower will continue. A careful and cautious position as the general assesses the strategic situation and is careful not to build expectations or over-commit.
Now we need to wait and see if Russia has culminated or if they still have sufficient combat power for a large offensive. And, what Ukraine’s next move will be.
Ben Morgan is a bored Gen Xer, a former Officer in NZDF and TDBs Military Blogger – his work is on substack
