A defining feature of the war in Ukraine is the myth that Russian victory is inevitable. Now, two and a half years since the war started the myth persists. Unfortunately, it leads to dangerous political assumptions about supporting Ukraine. Often media and political discussions start from the assumption of eventual Russian victory, leading to questions about supporting Ukraine being framed in negative terms.
Essentially, that Ukraine is lucky to have survived and that since Russian victory is inevitable, investing further support is only prolonging the suffering. Further, that it is pragmatic for Ukraine and its supporters to ‘cut their losses,’ accept the inevitable and broker a peace deal based on the current line of control. Assumptions, that should be challenged because they are not supported by evidence.
The myth of Russian invincibility
After the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, Russia presented itself as the union’s heir. Russia inherited the Soviet nuclear arsenal and much of its military equipment. Most importantly, Russia felt that it inherited the Soviet Union’s super power status. Russia, presented its military as the heir to the Soviet military machine. A powerful force that defeated Nazism in World War Two, then stood toe-to-toe with the US and NATO through 45 years of Cold War.
During the Cold War, generations of Western servicepeople trained and planned to fight the Soviets; and the huge military machine they faced was powerful. Soviet armies intervened effectively in Hungary and Czechoslovakia projecting power within Europe. The invasion of Afghanistan was sudden and well-executed, even if the war was eventually unsuccessful. The Soviets were a dangerous threat. Many contemporary military leaders were junior officers in 1991, trained to fight the Soviets and that threat continues to echo in the minds of service planners, politicians and commentator. Unfortunately, this historic threat is often convoluted with modern Russia a completely different threat.
For instance, the Ukraine War started with Western military commentators painting a picture of inevitable Russian victory. The media told us that Russia has the second most powerful army in the world, an army of super soldiers and advanced equipment. Ukraine’s fall seemed inevitable. Even the Pentagon believed the hype, offering to evacuate President Zelenskyy from Kyiv.
Commentators told us that today’s Russian army descends from the force that endured, and won the largest and most bloody battles of World War Two: Stalingrad, Leningrad, Kharkov and Kursk. Russian combat equipment was better, they said. Simple and roughly made but robust, effective and tested in combat. Kalashnikov rifles were indestructible. Russian tanks were faster, smaller and well-armed. Russia has huge stockpiles of artillery and can apply their fire to devastating effect. Simple, robust Russian fighter aircraft and helicopters were more reliable and easier to maintain than US planes. And, because they were cheaper Russia could fill the skies with them. Further, Russia has enormous natural resources and an inexhaustible supply of soldiers, we are told.
But invading Ukraine exposed the truth
Early in the war, it became apparent that Russia’s military does not meet expectations. In the first days of the war, this column discussed the impact that modern Western anti-tank missiles like Javelin and NLAW would have on Russian forces. That instead of a foregone conclusion Russia’s invasion force was too small and its armoured vehicles too vulnerable to modern weapons. Additionally, even with surprise on its side the Russian air force had failed to achieve air superiority.
Then as days turned into weeks, we saw the slow collapse of Russia’s logistics networks, years of corruption taking its toll on battlefield effectiveness. Throughout the war Russia has been unable to demonstrate effective operational manoeuvre.
A claim that will be challenged, but that I stand by.
The last operationally significant manoeuvre initiated by Russia was the invasion, in February 2022. Despite occupying large areas in Kherson and Kharkiv they were out manoeuvred and forced to withdraw from these areas in late-2022. The capture of Bakhmut and Avdiivka in 2023, did not decisively change the campaign or open opportunities for Russia to advance, neither hard won victory was operationally significant.
Russia has demonstrated the ability to hold ground, stopping Ukraine’s offensive in 2023, but wars are not won by holding ground. Russia started the war with the advantages of size, more modern equipment and surprise but has failed to defeat Ukraine.
The current situation on land
Victory, in Ukraine is defined by success in the land campaign; and on land the frontlines remain static. A situation that has not changed for months, Russia’s offensive near Kharkiv has culminated and there are reports that Ukraine is counter-attacking near Vovchansk. East of Kharkiv on the Kremina-Svatove Line, positional fighting took place this week Russia advancing marginally near Kupyansk. Ukraine matching this advance near Kremina.
Further south, Ukraine still holds Chasiv Yar. An important town that sits on high ground, that if captured could be used as a firm base for a Russian advance towards the cities of Sloviansk and Kramatorsk. Fighting continues between Toretsk and Marinka without significant changes in the frontline.
Overall, the land campaign has stagnated and the next question is – Which side is more likely to generate extra combat power in the future? Because, the side that can generate more combat power is the one that is going to be the side that breaks the current deadlock.
Ukraine’s air campaign, generating additional combat power
It is probably a misnomer, because Ukraine’s air campaign is mostly being fought on the ground. Ukrainian long-range missiles and drones slowly but surely degrading Russia’s local air-defence network. Russian air defence missile launchers, the radars that guide their missiles and the Airborne Early Warning and Command aircraft that manage the airspace over Ukraine are all being targeted. The overall aim of this campaign is clearly to create conditions for using new F-16 and Mirage 2000 fighters as they arrive in Ukraine, ready for action.
Ukraine will probably continue to target Russian air-defence missiles in Crimea, destroying them and drawing more from across the wider campaign into the peninsular, where they too can be destroyed. Crimea’s importance to Russia being used to create a vulnerability. The overall aim is to degrade Russian air-defences over Ukraine so that new fighter aircraft can be used to support operationally significant manoeuvre on land.
The number of F-16s pledged to Ukraine is relatively small, 64 frontline aircraft backed by a pool for training. A force this size cannot dominate the whole frontline, but could create air superiority over a small sector supporting a ground attack or to defeat a Russian offensive. The F-16s will start entering service over Ukraine soon and will be followed later in the year by French Mirage 2000 fighters.
Ukrainian force generation on land
Longer-term, Ukraine is generating combat power on land. New factories are being opened in Europe and in the US to produce artillery shells, European nations are training Ukrainian service people and billions of dollars of military aid is being transferred to Ukraine. Aid that is confirmed in long-term bi-lateral agreements or uses frozen Russian assets, mechanisms that help guarantee sustainability. Additionally, Ukraine recently tightened conscription laws to ensure a flow of service personnel into the military.
Russia on the other hand has fully mobilised its defence industry that is already at peak capacity. It has not called for full national mobilisation though. Probably because this would be politically unacceptable and Putin believes he can find soldiers elsewhere. Another gamble because Ukraine’s frontline is holding and they are inflicting losses on Russia at a rate of roughly five to one. A rate that Russia cannot sustain indefinitely without mobilising further.
Even with an extra battalion (4-800 soldiers) from North Korea, Russia’s generation of land combat power is either static or declining, while Ukraine’s is increasing. This process will take time, I do not expect Ukrainian offensive action until 2025.
After the 2023 offensive, Ukraine will be more cautious and will work slowly to build the force elements it lacked. Specifically, tactical airpower that can support ground operations, stockpiles artillery ammunition, engineering assets to breech defensive lines and frontline air-defence.
Summary
Russian victory is not inevitable and it never was, the invasion was a gamble. Russia invaded with too few soldiers and is now burning through the vast stockpile of equipment it inherited from the Soviet Union. Assumptions about Russia need to change, it is not the Superpower that the Soviet Union once was; its population is about half the size of the US and its economy is only marginally larger than Australia’s. Russian industry can produce plenty of artillery shells and refurbish tanks from war stocks but it is not able to match US or European production.
The Russian military has proven inept. Throughout the war it has been plagued by poor leadership and bad decisions, including the recent Kharkiv offensive. An operation that achieved nothing more than diverting forces from a useful operation, capturing Chasiv Yar. Its soldiers are poorly trained and led, although there have been some useful tactical improvements they are probably too little too late.
Regardless of what some commentators will tell you about Russia’s enormous military power or Putin’s genius, results are what matters. During the first half of this year, while US support waivered Russia had its best opportunity to strike hard and make an operationally significant manoeuvre. Instead of concentrating their forces they dissipated their effort along the frontline and opened a new axis of attack in Kharkiv Oblast. This is not masterful campaign planning. Instead, it demonstrates that senior commanders are not working together and lack discipline.
Currently, we are entering a period of nuclear brinkmanship as Putin realises the situation Russia is in, that victory is not inevitable. His response is to threaten and to play off the West’s fear of the Soviet Union. It is important that NATO and the US acknowledge this risk but are not overwhelmed by it. If Putin was going to use tactical nuclear weapons he would have, by surprise early in the war with a huge psychological impact. Now if Putin uses a tactical nuclear weapon, as it detonates, NATO war planes and cruise missiles will be in the air on the way to their targets. NATO is prepared now and their military capability far outstrips Russia’s so the potential consequences of using these weapons are too high to justify the risk.
At this stage, we need to look past Russia’s carefully crafted image of invincibility, to see the reality of the Russian war machine. Broken by corruption, poorly led and surviving by feeding the youth of Russia’s poorest republics to Ukraine’s guns. Today’s Russian military is not the Soviet military, it is a shadow of that force and as more light is shone on it, the more the shadow diminishes.
Commentators need to actively challenge the assumption that Russian victory is inevitable because the evidence does not support the assumption. Instead, with time and international support Ukraine can drive Russia out of its territory.
Ben Morgan is a bored Gen Xer, a former Officer in NZDF and TDBs Military Blogger – his work is on substack
