The week’s biggest news is that the G7 has a plan to use Russian assets frozen in Western countries to support Ukraine. A blow for Putin because it ensures Ukraine’s viability for at least another year. The G7’s plan, combined with a growing number of bi-lateral security agreements guaranteeing long-term aid, mean Ukraine’s position is increasingly secure.
This weekend diplomats from 90 countries met in Switzerland to discuss the Ukraine War. Although, Russia and China did not attend, the conference is likely to impact on the war, as more countries distance themselves from Russia and support Ukraine. Putin responded to the conference by releasing his conditions for a ceasefire.
On the front line, there was no significant movement this week but Ukraine’s air campaign continues to deplete Russia’s air force and degrade its air defence network. An essential prelude to future offensive operations or the isolation of Crimea.
Putin’s cease fire conditions As diplomats descended on Switzerland to discuss Ukraine, Putin issued a cease fire offer, although the term ‘demand’ would be a better description. Putin’s conditions for a cease fire are laughable, and include a Ukrainian withdrawal from all territory annexed by Russia including all of Kherson, Zaporizhia, Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts (regions). Ukraine currently holds roughly half of both Kherson and Zaporizhia Oblasts and about a fifth of Luhansk including two large cities, Sloviansk and Kramatorsk. Additionally, Putin’s demands include Ukraine never joining NATO.
Ukraine is never going to consider this proposal and it is hard to understand Putin’s objective. The proposal is not realistic enough to demonstrate any real desire to negotiate, so my assessment is that it is aimed at the Russian domestic audience, designed to demonstrate Putin’s reasonableness and willingness to pursue a peaceful solution.
Although Russia is losing, it is not beaten yet and re-taking all of Ukraine is an enormous and expensive proposition, that will need considerable international support. Considerations that mean the war is more likely to end in a negotiated settlement. So, at this stage in the war it is surprising that Putin is not looking for negotiation. A cease fire would provide time to rebuild and rearm; while continuing to fight he risks complete destruction of Russia’s military.
NATO and G7’s response to Putin’s strategy
Last week’s article discussed Putin’s comments about strategy, that his aim was to continue small but continuous offensive operations indefinitely. Slowly, ‘squeezing’ Ukrainian forces out of Luhansk, Donetsk, Kherson, Zaporizhia and Crimea, aiming to outlast US and NATO support. Currently Russia’s casualty rate is roughly equivalent its ability to recruit and train new soldiers, so in theory Putin can continue the ‘Special Military Operation’ at its current low tempo almost indefinitely.
Putin’s strategy is probably a reflection of Russian weakness, that manpower and equipment available is not unlimited and that the political opportunity cost of a total mobilisation is too great. Essentially, that the war must be prosecuted without total mobilisation, meaning that there is no chance re-constitute Russia’s land forces to the level of capability required for decisive manoeuvre. Russia’s plans are dictated by its means, and currently its means are very limited. Therefore, if Putin wants to continue the war he must fight without decisive, operational level manoeuvre and that is why his strategy is using tactical operations to ‘squeeze’ Ukraine slowly out of areas he desires.
But this strategy relies on a couple of assumptions, the first of which is that the US and Europe will lose interest and their support for Ukraine will wane. The second of his assumptions is that the lethality of Ukraine’s frontline forces remains constant.
Regarding the first assumption, this week’s G7 announcement is important news that should shake Putin’s confidence. The G7 proposal uses approximately $ 260-300 billion dollars of Russian state wealth currently frozen in the US, Belgium, France and Germany to support Ukraine. This is a thorny issue because historically state funds deposited overseas are not seized during conflict. Essentially, banking has traditionally been agnostic to politics. So, any change to this policy must be carefully considered because doing so could undermine confidence in the international financial system. Another consideration is that seizing the funds also reduces future negotiating power with Russia. Currently, Ukraine and its supporters hold $ 260-300 billion of Russian wealth, a powerful bargaining chip.
The G7 proposal is very recent so details may change but it appears to be; that the US will loan Ukraine $ 50 billion. Interest accruing on the frozen funds providing collateral to secure the loan. An elegant approach because it does not diminish the principal, retaining it for use as a bargaining chip with Putin. Additionally, a secured loan is unlikely to be withdrawn or cancelled by future US administrations. Finally, not using the principal contributes to securing Ukraine from nuclear attack because if the country is destroyed and cannot repay the loan the principal could be used to repay the debt. Dis-incentivising the destruction of Ukraine.
This proposal is bad news for Russia because it provides another $ 50 billion of aid securing Ukraine’s war effort at least through 2025 and probably longer. Additionally, Ukraine has recently been signing a range of bi-lateral security agreements, an initiative driven by NATO Secretary General, Jens Stoltenberg aimed at securing long-term support for Ukraine. Starting with the UK in January, seventeen nations have now committed. Germany, France, Denmark, Canada, Italy, Netherlands, Finland, Latvia, Spain, Belgium, Portugal, Sweden, Norway, Iceland and as of 13 June the US and Japan.
Japan’s inclusion is an important indication of how this scheme may evolve. Japan is a powerful nation closely aligned with the US and determined to support the international rules-based order. By supporting Ukraine Japan is actively deterring its geographically closer rival, China. Regular readers will be aware of the growing links between NATO and the Indo-Pacific region, and my guess is that we will soon see other US allies like South Korea and Australia entering these bi-lateral arrangements. Securing the flow of aid to Ukraine and challenging Putin’s assumption that Russia can ‘out wait’ Ukraine’s international support.
Regarding Russia’s second assumption, that current mobilisation can produce enough men and material to ‘squeeze’ Ukraine’s forces out of the contested areas. The attrition Ukraine is currently inflicting is being absorbed, but unfortunately for Putin, this assumption may soon be challenged because Ukraine is receiving more foreign aid increasing its force’s lethality. Russian casualty rates edging higher in recent months, from roughly 1000 per day early this year to 1200 per day as Ukraine receives artillery ammunition and missiles from its supporters. Most estimates put Russia’s ability to generate new soldiers at about 30,000 per month, if casualty rates remain at 1200 per day, then attrition is going to force Russian forces to reduce their activity rate. Any increase in Ukrainian lethality will amplify this trend, nullifying the strategy. And, every week more ammunition and equipment arrives in Ukraine.
Putin’s response to the G7 plan included more nuclear sabre-rattling and threats that G7 nations will pay for stealing Russia’s funds. Threats that indicate how much Putin needs the money frozen off-shore, and that the funds are a useful bargaining chip.
The land campaign, an update
On land, the campaign continues to evolve as predicted. Ukraine holding its defensive line, Russia failing to make operationally significant advances. Chasiv Yar, an area assessed as providing an opportunity operational manoeuvre remains firmly in Ukrainian hands.
The incursion into Kharkiv Oblast appears to have culminated and the predicted crossing into Sumy Oblast has not occurred. Recently, there are unconfirmed reports of Ukrainian advances near Vovchansk the town at the centre of recent fighting in Kharkiv Oblast.
‘Scoobie Doo Vans,’ another indication of the Russian Army’s depletion
Internet analyst Peter Zeihan, calls the Russian UAZ 452 off-road van, the ‘Scoobie Doo Van’ because of its resemblance to the cartoon character’s transport. Zeihan and other commentators note the increasing use of these little vans along with civilian vehicles and motorbikes to support frontline forces.
Use of these vehicles is an indication of the attrition that Russia’s army has suffered. It started the war with large numbers of modern tactical trucks, a fleet that has been slowly destroyed by Javelin, NLAW and drones. Russian forces using second-rate vehicles like the UAZ 452 in a range of front line roles is evidence that the tactical truck fleet is not being replaced.
Like trucks, tanks and armoured personnel carriers are also increasingly absent from the frontlines. Possibly this is a response to the effectiveness of anti-armour weapons but it is also likely that these assets are simply unable to be replaced or kept serviceable.
Ukraine’s strategy, isolating Crimea
This week Ukraine’s focus on using long-range weapons to degrade Russian airpower and isolate Crimea continued, including destroying a couple of Su 57, Fifth Generation fighters on 8 June. The peninsula’s air defence assets were targeted successfully on 10 – 12 June, Ukraine destroying two S300/400 air defence missile launchers and two radars that guide these sophisticated and effective missiles.
Ukraine’s ATACMs strikes on Crimea’s air defences are effective, recently forcing the withdrawal of 18 Black Sea Fleet ships from Novorossiysk, a port considered relatively safe until. After repeated attacks on Sevastopol, the Black Sea Fleet withdrew to Novorossiysk, and this port is now unsafe. The peninsula no longer providing an air defence buffer zone for this port, on the Black Sea coast of Krasnodar Krai Oblast.
Al Jazeera reports that pro-Ukraine, Crimean partisan group, Atesh believes Russia has been forced to move S300 and S400 batteries from Crimea to protect Belgorod and other staging and logistics areas supporting the Kharkiv offensive. Another example of Russia’s poor decision-making with regards to the offensive. An operation that triggered the US and European nations to remove restrictions on using long-range weapons against targets on Russian territory. And, is now requiring the movement of air defence missiles from Crimea to support the operation, thereby enhancing Ukraine’s ability to strike Crimea.
This activity will continue, Ukraine degrading Russian air defence capability by attacking aircraft, radars and missile launchers. When it is sufficiently degraded Ukraine will increase the intensity of its strikes on access points for Russian logistics, supplying the peninsula. Additionally, the battle will be integrated with the arrival F16 and Mirage 2000 aircraft from the West. Ukraine’s current missile led campaign paving the way for these aircraft to be used either supporting ground manoeuvre or to carry out strikes that further isolate Crimea.
Summary
This week copies of a letter to museum curators in Crimea was circulated on the internet and in the media. The letter instructing curators to prepare artworks and artifacts for evacuation from the peninsula. A small but important insight into Russia’s situation, indicating concerns within the elite about the progress of the war. It is a evidence that Ukraine is slowly but surely securing long-term and sustainable support, challenging Putin’s plans.
The war is far from over but this week the chances of Russian victory got smaller, Putin’s response was more threats and demonstrations of force. The reality though is that the international community is slowly by surely rallying behind Ukraine and Russia’s defeat is more likely now.
Ben Morgan is a bored Gen Xer, a former Officer in NZDF and TDBs Military Blogger – his work is on substack